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ON THE EXISTENCE OF BERTRAND-NASH
EQUILIBRIUM PRICES UNDER LOGIT DEMAND
W. ROSS MORROW AND STEVEN J. SKERLOS
Abstract. This article proves the existence of equilibrium prices in
Bertrand competition with multi-product firms using the Logit model
of demand. The most general proof, an application of the Poincare-
Hopf Theorem, does not rely on restrictive assumptions such as single-
product firms, firm homogeneity or symmetry, homogeneous product
costs, or even concavity of the utility function with respect to prices.
This proof relies on new conditions for the indirect utility function, along
with fixed-point equations derived from the first-order conditions and a
direct analysis of the second-order conditions that proves the uniqueness
of profit-maximizing prices. The degree to which our conditions are as
weak as possible is discussed. Models with finite purchasing power and
convex total costs are also addressed. Analysis of equilibrium prices for
multi-product firms with constant unit costs suggests that Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium cannot adequately describe multi-product pricing in
differentiated product markets.
1. Introduction
Bertrand competiton has been a prominent paradigm for the empirical
study of differentiated product markets for over twenty years [14, 10, 19,
51, 24, 20, 49, 43, 11, 48, 1]. Most of these empirical applications have
been undertaken without theoretical assurances of the existence, unique-
ness, and even “plausibility” of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices. This
article proves the existence of equilibrium prices for differentiated product
market models based on the Logit model under weak conditions on the (in-
direct) utility function and convex total costs (i.e., unit costs that increase
with volume). Further analysis reveals some counter-intuitive properties of
equilibrium prices that suggest more complex models than Logit are required
to adequately model differentiated product markets in price competition.
Significant portions of this research were undertaken while W. Ross Morrow was a
Ph.D. student in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Michigan. The National
Science Foundation, the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute’s Doc-
toral Studies Program, and Iowa State University provided support for this research. The
authors wish to thank Fred Feinberg, Erin MacDonald, Jong-Shi Pang, Che-Lin Su, and
Norman Shiau for helpful suggestions.
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Most existing theoretical analyses of Bertrand competition are based on
assumptions too restrictive to suit empirical applications of Bertrand com-
petition and that obscure potentially counterintuitive properties of equilib-
rium. For example, there are few theoretical studies that consider multi-
product firms (see, e.g., [46, 4, 6]), but real firms in differentiated product
markets almost always offer more than one product. Theoretical analyses of
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices have also typically relied on homogeneity
or “symmetry” between firms with respect to the costs and “values”1 of the
products offered. Real markets are heterogeneous with respect to the num-
ber of products offered, the values consumers derive from these products,
and the costs with which these products are produced. In one analysis,
Anderson & dePalma [6] state that
“empirical application[s] would have to relax the symmetry
assumptions and allow firms to produce products of different
qualities, allow for heterogeneity across firms, and differing
costs to introducing products.” [6, pg. 98]
Thus, existing theoretical analyses currently offer limited support to empir-
ical applications of differentiated product market models or other models in
which Logit models might be useful, such as those described by Gallego et.
al [18].
A theoretical understanding of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices begins
with the conditions under which equilibrium prices exist. Perloff [42] pro-
vided an early existence proof for Bertrand-Nash equilibrium under a gen-
eral Random Utility Maximization (RUM) model. Firms in Perloff’s model
are ‘systematically homogeneous’ in that product differentiation exists only
through random brand preference, rather than differentiated product char-
acteristics and unit costs. Anderson & dePalma [3] undertake an analysis
of equilibrium with single-product firms focusing on the linear-in-price util-
ity Logit model. They characterize equilibrium prices with a closed-form
expression when there is no outside good, and as solutions to a fixed-point
equation when an outside good exists. Milgrom & Roberts [28]m Caplin
& Nalebuff [15], and Gallego et. al [18] have also provided equilibrium ex-
istence proofs for Bertrand competition between single-product firms that
apply to the Logit RUM, assuming utility is linear in price. Such results
have been used to ensure that empirical single-product firm models based
on Bertrand competition are well-posed [40, 7, 21, 5]. More recently, Sandor
[45] and Konovalov & Sandor [27] have proven the existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium prices with multi-product firms and the linear-in-price utility
Logit model. Beyond models with single-product firms and linear utility
functions, the literature lacks general conditions under which equilibrium
1Authors in the theoretical literature use the term “quality” to describe the non-price
utility of a product [35]. This use of the term is confounded with the way it would
be interpreted by many engineers, marketers, operations researchers, or laypeople as a
measure of reliability.
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exists. Without this understanding, it is not known if empirical examples
cannot have equilibrium prices. This article provides one example where
this has already occurred.
Unfortunately the mathematical methods employed in these works cannot
be extended to establish the existence of equilibrium prices for models with
multi-product firms and general non-linear utility functions. Perloff’s [42]
and Anderson & dePalma’s [3] analyses are specific to symmetric equilib-
rium between homogeneous single-product firms. While Milgrom & Roberts
[28] apply a general property − “supermodularity” − to prove the existence
(and uniqueness) of single-product firm equilibrium prices under Logit, San-
dor [45] has shown that multi-product firm profit functions under linear-in-
price utility Logit fail to be supermodular arbitrarily near equilibrium prices,
ruling out the application of this property for multi-product firms; Appen-
dix C extends Sandor’s proof to any Logit model within the class studied
here. Similarly, the proofs from Caplin & Nalebuff [15] and Gallego et. al
[18] rely on quasi-concavity of the firms’ profit functions. Hanson & Martin
[22], however, have observed that multi-product firm profits are not quasi-
concave under the Logit model. Thus new mathematical tools are needed to
prove the existence of equilibrium prices for Bertrand competition between
multi-product firms.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a
framework for Bertrand competition under an arbitrary RUM model as-
suming unit costs are constant (equivalently, total costs depend linearly on
quantity sold). Special attention is paid to the interpretation of an RUM
model as the generator of a stochastic choice process leading to random de-
mand, highlighting some implicit assumptions that may not be commonly
acknowledged. Section 3 specializes this framework to the Logit RUMmodel,
equivalent to the “attraction demand model” being used by some researchers
in revenue management (e.g., [18]). Specifically, Section 3 presents a new set
of utility specifications, defines the Logit choice probabilities, and identifies
when firm profits under the Logit model are bounded.
Section 4 proves the existence of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices using
fixed-point equations derived from the first-order or “Simultaneous Station-
arity” condition when unit costs are constant. Most existing analyses of
equilibrium prices also rely on the first-order condition. Moreover, fixed-
point expressions have already been utilized to characterize equilibrium un-
der linear-in-price utility Logit models [3, 10, 12, 45, 27] and even for more
complex Mixed Logit models [10, 31, 33, 32]. Here three fixed-point equa-
tions for Logit models are derived, two of which generalize to Mixed Logit
models; see [31, 33, 32]. As is common in analyses of equilibrium, the
existence proof has two parts: proving that (i) there exist simultaneously
stationary prices and (ii) simultaneously stationary prices are in fact equi-
libria. Existence proofs using both Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem and the
Poincare-Hopf Theorem [29, Chapter 6] are given. The Poincare-Hopf ap-
proach to this problem was first taken in [31], and has also been used by
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Konovalov & Sandor [27], restricting the utility function to be linear-in-price.
Simsek et. al [47] provide several references to applications of the Poincare-
Hopf Theorem in general equilibrium models. Identifying simultaneously
stationary prices with equilibria requires a direct analysis of the second-
order conditions, combined with a second application of the Poincare-Hopf
Theorem to prove the uniqueness of profit-maximizing prices, circumventing
the lack of quasi-concavity in Logit profits for multi-product firms. These
results are based on new, general conditions on the utility function that are
weaker than most assumptions currently applied in theoretical economics,
econometrics, and marketing.
Sections 5 and 6 generalize the analysis in Section 4 to address non-
constant unit costs and populations with finite purchasing power, respec-
tively. The treatment of non-constant unit costs is a fairly straightforward
extension of the analysis for the constant unit cost case, at least when to-
tal costs are convex (that is, unit costs are increasing in volume). Limits
on purchasing power qualitatively change the behavior that may occur in
equilibrium: While every product has a non-zero (if small) probability of
being purchased in equilibrium with no such limit, some products can be
profit-optimally “priced out of the market” when there is a finite limit on
purchasing power. The fixed-point approach from the traditional, no-limit
case is extended to characterize equilibrium prices when there is a limit, and
existence is proved with essentially the same methods.
Finally, Section 7 identifies several structural properties of equilibrium
prices under the Logit model. First, if the consumer population systemati-
cally values some product’s characteristics more than the same firm’s other
offerings, that product must be given lower profit-optimal markup by the
firm in equilibrium when unit costs are constant. This counterintuitive re-
sult cannot be observed in analyses with single-product firms, and relies
only on the common assumptions that (i) utility is concave in price and
separable in price and characteristics and (ii) unit costs, though constant,
increase with the value of product characteristics [35, 14]. As a consequence,
Bertand competition under Logit with conventional utility specifications and
constant unit costs cannot have fixed percentage markups as an equilibrium
outcome; i.e. “cost plus pricing” [36] is not rationalized by Bertrand com-
petition under conventional Logit models. Second, there exists a portfolio
effect for Bertrand-Nash equilibrium under Logit with constant unit costs:
equilibrium prices for an identical product offered at the same unit cost by
two distinct firms depends on the profitability of the entire portfolio of prod-
ucts offered by these firms. In other words, heterogeneous portfolios can lead
to distinct equilibrium prices for otherwise identical products. This property
would not be observed from analyses that assume firms are homogeneous.
The most limiting assumption in this article is the absence of consumer
heterogeneity in the choice model. The Logit RUM model does allows some
random variance in the utilities individuals in the population derive from
the differentiated products, and thus contains some degree of population
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heterogeneity. However, the degree to which this is expressed with the Logit
model has long been known to generate patterns of substitution that are
unrealistic form many empirical applications [10, 50]. The techniques used
in this paper to prove the existence of simultaneously stationary prices can
be extended to a large class of Mixed Logit models with some ease; see
[33, 32]. Moreover, the fixed-point equations used here are very useful in
computations of equilibrium prices under such models [33]. However, the
central element of the existence results established here is a generalization of
quasi-concavity property that ensures profits under Logit have unique profit-
maximizing prices. The conditions under which such a condition holds for
Mixed Logit models are not obvious and will be nontrivial [33].
A review of mathematical notation, several examples, and additional re-
sults are provided in the appendices.
2. Bertrand Competition Under an Arbitrary Random Utility
Model
This section presents a mathematical framework for Bertrand competi-
tion under an arbitrary Random Utility Maximization (RUM) model. This
generalizes the discussion in [8] to multi-product firms and RUM demand.
Conceptually, a fixed number of firms decide on prices for a fixed set of
products prior to some time period in which these prices must remain fixed.
During this purchasing period, a fixed number of individuals independently
choose to purchase one of the products offered by these firms, or to forgo
purchase of any of these products, following a given RUM model. Verboven
[51] describes this as a two-stage stochastic game, where in the first stage
the firms choose prices and in the second stage individuals choose prod-
ucts to maximize their own utility after sampling, or “drawing,” from the
distribution of random utilities.2
2.1. Random Utility Models and Demand for Products. RUM mod-
els provide a means to describe selection from a choice set, a collection of
J ∈ N products that individuals may choose to purchase along with a no-
purchase option (or “outside good”) indexed by 0. Each product j ∈ N(J)
is characterized by its price pj ∈ [0,∞) and vector of characteristics yj ∈ Y,
where Y ⊂ RK for some K ∈ N.
The random variable Ui,j(yj , pj) gives the utility individual i receives by
purchasing product j ∈ N(J), while the random variable Ui,0 gives the utility
received by not purchasing any of the products (i.e. “purchasing the outside
good”). Conditional on the values of {Ui,0}∪{Ui,j(yj , pj)}j∈N(J), individual
i chooses the option j ∈ {0} ∪ N(J) with the highest utility. The choice
variable Ci(Y,p) encapsulates this selection, taking values in {0} ∪ N(J)
2In the second stage, all consumers have dominant strategies.
6 W. ROSS MORROW AND STEVEN J. SKERLOS
following the distribution
P(Ci(Y,p) = j) =


P
(
Ui,j(yj , pj) = max
{
Ui,0 , max
k∈N(J)
Ui,k(yk, pk)
})
if j ∈ N(J)
P
(
Ui,0 = max
{
Ui,0 , max
k∈N(J)
Ui,k(yk, pk)
})
if j = 0
The distribution of these random utilities assures that “ties” occur with
probability zero. Let
Ui(Y,p) = (Ui,0, Ui,1(Y,p), . . . , Ui,J(Y,p)),
and make the following assumption:
Assumption 2.1. For any (Y,p) ∈ YJ × RJ+ and i, i
′ ∈ N(I), Ui(Y,p)
and Ui′(Y,p) are independent and identically distributed.
Under this common assumption, the individual index on utilities and the
choice variable can be dropped. Note also that this does not imply that
Uj(yj , pj) and Uk(yk, pk) are independent.
In practice, models often take the form
U0 = ϑ+ E0 and Uj(yj , pj) = u(yj , pj) + Ej for all j ∈ N(J)
for some (conditional, indirect) utility function u : Y × [0,∞) → R, ϑ ∈
[−∞,∞) and “error” vector E = {Ej}
J
j=0. When E is given an i.i.d. ex-
treme value distribution, we have the Logit RUM [3, 50].3 Letting E have
a Generalized Extreme Value distribution we have a GEV RUM like the
Nested Logit model [50, 13], or taking E multivariate normal gives the Pro-
bit RUM [50]. Either of these latter two forms can have a E with correlated
components.4
Demands, the total quantity of each product purchased during the pur-
chasing period, must be defined to define firms’ profits. Extrapolating de-
mands from the stochastic choice model above requires the following as-
sumption.
Assumption 2.2. Every individual i ∈ N(I) observes the same choice set,
{0} ∪ N(J), during the purchase period.
3This independence assumption on E is distinct from our independence assumption
on the random utilities in that now it is independence across products in the choice set,
rather than across individuals in the population.
4More generally, we can let T be a space of individual characteristics or “demographics”
and define
U0 = ϑ(Θ) + E0 and Uj(yj , pj) = u(Θ,yj , pj) + Ej for all j ∈ N(J)
where u : T × Y × [0,∞) → R, ϑ : T → [−∞,∞) where Θ is a T -valued random
variable with the distribution µ, ostensibly representing the distribution of demographic
variables over the population. With the same error distribution, we obtain a “mixed”
RUM. Particularly, taking E i.i.d. extreme value gives the “random coefficients” or Mixed
Logit RUM class [50, Chapter 6].
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Under this assumption, the demand Qj(Y,p) for each product j ∈ N(J)
can be expressed simply asQj(Y,p) =
∑I
i=1 1{Ci(Y,p)=j}, where here {Ci(Y,p)}i∈N(I)
are I i.i.d. “copies” of C(Y,p). The primary benefit of Assumption 2.2 is
that {Q0(Y,p)}∪{Qj(Y,p)}j∈N(J) is a multinomial family of variables with
parameter I and probabilities {Pj(Y,p)}
J
j=0, and thus expected demands
for each product are given simply by E[Qj(Y,p)] = IPj(Y,p) [17].
A more serious implication of Assumption 2.2 is there must be at least
I units of every product available for the individuals to choose during the
purchasing period.5 Specifically, no product can “sell out,” or if it does,
“backordering” does not impact utilities. If any firm commits (or is forced
by capacity constraints) to only produce I ′ < I units of some product they
offer during the purchasing period and individuals do not “backorder”, then
with some positive probability Assumption 2.2 will be violated.
2.2. Firms, Product Portfolios, Costs, and Profits. Let F ∈ N denote
the number of firms. For each f ∈ N(F ), there exists a set Jf ⊂ N(J) of
indices that corresponds to the Jf = |Jf | products offered by firm f . The
collection of all these sets, {Jf}
F
f=1, forms a partition of N(J). Subsequently,
in writing “f(j)” for some j ∈ N(J), we mean the unique f ∈ N(F ) such that
j ∈ Jf . The vector pf ∈ R
Jf refers to the vector of prices of the products
offered by firm f . Negative subscripts denote competitor’s variables as in,
for instance, p−f ∈ R
J−f , where J−f =
∑
g 6=f Jg, is the vector of prices
for products offered by all of firm f ’s competitors. Firm-specific choice
probability functions are denoted by Pf (p).
Additional assumptions concerning costs and production are required to
complete the definition of firms’ profits.
Assumption 2.3. There exists a unit cost function cUf : Y → R+ and a
fixed cost function cFf : F(Y) → R+ for all f ∈ N(F ) that depend only on
the collection of product characteristics chosen by the firm.
Particularly, unit and fixed costs are independent of the quantity sold,
ruling out dependence of unit and fixed costs on production volumes. This
assumption is relaxed in Section 5 below. Bertrand competition also entails
the following “comittment” assumption on the quantities produced [8].
Assumption 2.4 (Bertrand Production Assumption). Each firm commits
to producing exactly Qj(Y,p) units of each product j ∈ Jf during the pur-
chasing period.
Again, this implies that the firm has no production capacity constraints
that limit a firm’s ability to meet any demands that arise during the purchase
period. The random variable
∑
j∈Jf
cUf (yj)Qj(Y,p)+c
F
f (Yf ) gives the total
cost firm f incurs in producing Qj(Y,p) units of product j, for all j ∈ Jf ,
5We could alternatively interpret this condition in terms of consumers “ordering” prod-
ucts during the purchasing period and assuming delivery schedules do not impact demand.
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during the purchasing period. We let cUf (Yf ) be the vector of these unit
costs for the products offered by firm f .
Under Assumption 2.4, the random variable Πf (Y,p) = Qf (Y,p)
⊤(pf −
cUf (Yf ))− c
F
f (Yf ) gives firm f ’s profits for the production period as a func-
tion of product characteristics and prices. Following most of the theoretical
and empirical literature in both marketing and economics, we assume that
firms take expected profits,
(1)
πf (Y,p) = Iπˆf (Y,p)−c
F
f (Yf ) where πˆf (Y,p) = Pf (Y,p)
⊤(pf−c
U
f (Yf )),
as the metric by which they optimize their pricing decisions in this stochastic
optimization problem.
Eqn. (1) demonstrates that neither the total firm fixed costs cFf nor
the population size I play a role in determining the prices that maximize
expected profits. Therefore we only consider the “population-normalized
gross expected profits” πˆf (p), referred to below as simply “profits”. We
also consider Y fixed, and cease to include this characteristic matrix as an
argument. Finally, we write cf = c
U
f as these are the only relevant costs for
the price equilibrium problem. Henceforth we write simply
πˆf (p) = Pf (p)
⊤(pf − cf ).
The following adaptation of well-known necessary conditions for the local
maximization of an unconstrained, continuously differentiable function (e.g.,
[34]) informs our derivation of the Simultaneous Stationarity Condition.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose Pf (·,p−f ) is continuously differentiable on some
open A ⊂ (0,∞) ⊂ RJf . If pf ∈ A is a local maximizer of πˆf (·,p−f ),
then
(2) (∇f πˆf )(p) = (DfPf )(p)
⊤(pf − cf ) +Pf (p) = 0.
2.3. Local Equilibrium and the Simultaneous Stationarity Condi-
tions. As in much of the existing literature, our analysis relies on local
conditions for optimality of prices and thus must rely on the following local
definition of equilibrium.
Definition 2.1. A price vector p ∈ [0,∞] is called a local equilibrium
if pf is a local maximizer of πˆf (·,p−f ) for all f ∈ N(F ). A price vector
p ∈ [0,∞] is called an equilibrium if pf is a maximizer of πˆf (·,p−f ) for all
f ∈ N(F ).
Finally, the following Simultaneous Stationarity Condition is a generic
necessary condition for local equilibrium if the RUM choice probabilities are
continuously differentiable in prices.
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Definition 2.2. Let (∇˜πˆ)(p) denote the “combined gradient” with compo-
nents ((∇˜πˆ)(p))j = (Dj πˆf(j))(p). Let (D˜P)(p) be the sparse matrix corre-
sponding to the intra-firm price derivatives of choice probabilities; that is,
(
(D˜P)(p)
)
j,k
=
{
(DkPj)(p) if f(j) = f(k)
0 if f(j) 6= f(k)
.
Lemma 2.2 (Simultaneous Stationarity Condition). Suppose P is contin-
uously differentiable on some open A ⊂ (0,∞). If p ∈ A is a local equilib-
rium, then
(3) (∇˜πˆ)(p) = (D˜P)(p)⊤(p− c) +P(p) = 0.
Prices satisfying Eqn. (3) are called “simultaneously stationary.” In prin-
ciple, simultaneously stationary prices need not be equilibria. Additional
analysis is required to link stationarity with local optimality of profits with
respect to changes to the prices of a firm’s own products.
The necessity of the Simultaneous Stationarity Condition does not depend
on the RUM type, but only on the continuous differentiability of the choice
probabilities (with respect to price) and the cost assumption. Furthermore,
much of this development is the same for an arbitrary demand function,
rather than a RUM; see, e.g., [14, 24]. Thus, Eqn. (3) has appeared in
many different studies using alternative RUM specifications such as Logit
models [12], Generalized Extreme Value models [19, 20, 12, 52], and Mixed
Logit models [10, 11, 37, 38, 49, 43, 48, 1, 9, 33]. In most of these studies,
Eqn. (3) has not been investigated far beyond Lemma 2.2.
Eqn. (3) has been consistently used through the corresponding BLP
markup equation p = c+ η(p) where
(4) η(p) = −(D˜P)(p)−⊤P(p)
assuming (D˜P)(p)⊤ is nonsingular.6 This equation is typically used to
estimate costs assuming prices are in equilibrium. However, the markup
equation p = c + η(p) is a fixed-point equation satisfied by all simultane-
ously stationary prices. In Section 4, we give a specific form for η under
the Logit model and derive a new fixed-point equation for simultaneously
stationary prices by factoring out the gradient of the inclusive value from
(∇˜πˆ)(p); this fixed-point equation is a specialization of the ζ-markup equa-
tion used by Morrow & Skerlos for large-scale computations of equilibrium
prices [33, 32].
3. Logit Models
This section reviews the Logit model, providing the groundwork for the
analysis in later sections. Section 3.1 defines a new class of nonlinear utility
functions for which equilibrium prices can be shown to exist. Section 3.2
6For competing single-product firms, this reduces to the famous “negative reciprocal
of elasticity” form for the Lerner index (i.e. percent markups); see [41].
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derives the corresponding Logit choice probabilities and their derivatives.
Finally, Section 3.3 provides conditions under which profit-maximizing prices
are finite, a pre-requisite for the existence of (finite) equilibrium prices.
3.1. Systematic Utility Specifications. The random utility any individ-
ual receives by purchasing any particular product is parameterized by its
characteristic vector and price through some function u : Y × [0,∞) →
[−∞,∞). We consider specifications of the following form.
Assumption 3.1. There are functions w : Y × [0,∞) → (−∞,∞) and
v : Y → (−∞,∞) such that utility can be written u(y, p) = w(y, p) + v(y).
Concerning the behavior of w, we assume that, for all y ∈ Y, w(y, ·) :
[0,∞) → (−∞,∞) is (a) strictly decreasing, and (b) continuously differ-
entiable on (0,∞). We also assume that (c) limp↑∞w(y, p) = −∞, and
subsequently set w(y,∞) = −∞.
Writing u(y, p) = w(y, p)+ v(y) is completely general so long as utility is
defined for all p ∈ [0,∞). This form is convenient to define the “value” of a
product as that component of utility that does not vary with price, and to
define “separable” utilities, the most common class of utility functions used
in practice.
Definition 3.1. We say v(y) is the value of any product with characteristic
vector y, and that utility is separable in price and characteristics (or
simply separable) if w(y, p) = w(p) for all y ∈ Y. We call |(Dw)(y, p)|−1
the (local) willingness to pay (for product value).
The class formed by Assm. 3.1 encompasses the majority of utility func-
tions used in the theoretical and empirical literature. Assm. (a) is required
of a suitable indirect utility function, and (b) is required for an analysis
of equilibrium based on the first-order conditions. The assumption (c) is a
natural condition that ensures that the choice probabilities vanish as prices
increase without bound. In fact, by including utility functions that are not
concave-in-price, this class is larger than that typically studied. A number
of examples are given in Appendix B.
Concave-in-price utilities are certainly an important special case often
considered in economics. However, concavity turns out to be a stronger
assumption than is required to ensure the existence of finite equilibrium
prices under Logit. Instead, the following weaker property of the utility
price derivatives is sufficient.
Definition 3.2. w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly at y ∈ Y
if there exists some r(y) > 1 and some p¯(y) ∈ [0,∞) such that (Dw)(y, p) ≤
−r(y)/p = −r(y)D[log p] for all p > p¯(y). w itself eventually decreases
sufficiently quickly if w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly at all y ∈
Y.
The most commonly used finite utility functions, particularly strictly de-
creasing and concave in price utility functions, satisfy limp→∞(Dw)(y, p) <
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0, and hence eventually decrease sufficiently quickly with any r. Note also
that if w does not eventually decrease sufficiently quickly at y, then nec-
essarily |(Dw)(y, p)| → 0 as p → ∞. The example w(y, p) = −α(y) log p
(α(y) > 0) shows that this does not contradict Assm. 3.1, (c).
A distinct requirement on the second derivatives of utility is synonymous
with the sufficiency of stationarity under Logit.
Definition 3.3. Suppose w(y, ·) is twice continuously differentiable for all
y ∈ Y. We say that w has sub-quadratic second derivatives at (y, p) ∈
Y × [0,∞) if ω(y, p) = (D2w)(y, p)/(Dw)(y, p)2 < 1. We say that w it-
self has sub-quadratic second derivatives if w has sub-quadratic second
derivatives at all (y, p) ∈ Y × [0,∞).
Note that if w(y, ·) is concave, then w trivially has sub-quadratic second
derivatives. However, w(y, ·) can be convex and still have sub-quadratic
second derivatives. For example, w(y, p) = −α(y) log p for α(y) > 1 has
ω(y, p) = 1/α < 1.
With any collection of fixed product characteristic vectors {yj}
J
j=1, we set
wj(p) = w(yj , p) and vj = v(yj) and thus generate a collection of product-
specific utility functions, uj(p) = wj(p) + vj, that depend on price alone.
Vector functions w : [0,∞]J → [−∞,∞)J and u : [0,∞]J → [−∞,∞)J are
constructed from these product-specific components by taking (w(p))j =
wj(pj) and (u(p))j = uj(pj). In particular, u(p) = w(p) + v. Firm-specific
product values vf and utilities uf (pf ) = wf(pf ) + vf are also defined in
the natural way.
3.2. Logit Choice Probabilities. The Logit model [50, Chapter 3] takes
the utility any individual receives when purchasing product j to be the
random variable Uj(yj , pj) = u(yj , pj) + Ej and the utility of the outside
good to be the random variable U0 = ϑ+ E0, where E = {Ej}
J
j=0 is a family
of i.i.d. standard extreme value variables and ϑ ∈ [−∞,∞) is a number
representing the utility of the outside good.
The i.i.d. standard extreme value specification for E generates the follow-
ing choice probabilities (see, e.g., [50]):
(5) PLj (p) =
euj(pj)
eϑ +
∑J
k=1 e
uk(pk)
The equivalent formula
PLj (p) =
e(uj(pj)−ϑ)
1 +
∑J
k=1 e
(uk(pk)−ϑ)
corresponding to setting ϑ = 0 is often seen in the literature, but offers no
substantial advantage to the analysis in this article. When ϑ = −∞,
PLj (p) =
euj(pj)∑J
k=1 e
uk(pk)
.
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The following basic properties of the Logit choice probabilities are used
throughout.
Lemma 3.1. The following hold under Assumption 3.1, for any j and f : (i)
0 < PLj (p) < 1 and P
L
f (p)
⊤1 < 1 for all p ∈ [0,∞)J . (iii) If ϑ > −∞ and
q ∈ [0,∞]J , limp→q P
L
j (p) exists. Moreover, limp→q P
L
j (p) = 0 if qj = ∞,
and PLf (p)
⊤1 < 1 for all p ∈ [0,∞]J . (iv) If ϑ = −∞, then for any
x ∈ [0, 1]J ,
∑J
j=1 xj = 1, there exists some sequence {p
(n)}n∈N ⊂ [0,∞)
J
with p(n) →∞ such that limn→∞P
L(p(n)) = x.
Proof. (i), (ii), and (iii) follow easily from Eqn. 5. To prove (iv), first note
that P : [0,∞)J →△(J) is onto when ϑ = −∞, where △(J) = {x ∈ [0, 1]J :∑J
j=1 xj = 1}. Let x ∈ △(J). It suffices to solve uj(pj) = log xj for pj, for
all j, for then
PLj (p) =
euj(pj)∑J
k=1 e
uk(pk)
=
elog xj∑J
k=1 e
log xk
=
xj∑J
k=1 xk
= xj .
So long as log xj ≥ uj(0), such a pj exists and is unique. Assuming, without
loss of generality, that uj(0) ≥ 0 for all j ensures that this condition holds
for all xj ∈ [0, 1]. The existence of a sequence tending to infinity with
limn→∞P
L(p(n)) = x then follows from the invariance result in Lemma 3.2
below. 
Claim (iv) amounts to the fact that the Logit choice probabilities with-
out an outside good cannot be both continuous and single valued on [0,∞]J ,
and suggests that the presence of an outside good “purchased” with positive
probability is very important to optimization and equilibrium problems un-
der Logit. As noted in the proof, this claim is a consequence of the following
generalization of the “invariance of uniform price shifts” property of the lin-
ear in price utility Logit model to the class of utility functions specified by
Assumption 3.1:
Lemma 3.2. Suppose w satisfies Assumption 3.1. For any p ∈ (0,∞) and
each j ∈ N(J), define χj,p : [1,∞)→ [p,∞) by χj,p(λ) = w
−1
j (wj(p)− log λ),
and define χp : [1,∞)→ [p,∞) componentwise by (χp(λ))j = χj,pj(λ). (i)
χp(λ) is well-defined, strictly increasing, and limλ→∞χp(λ) = ∞. (ii) If
ϑ = −∞, PL is invariant on χp([1,∞)); i.e., P
L(χp(λ)) ≡ P
L(p). (iii)
If ϑ > −∞, PL(χp(λ)) is strictly decreasing in λ, and P
L(χp(λ)) → 0 as
λ→∞.
Proof. (i): By definition, wj(χj,p(λ)) = wj(p)− log λ. Because wj is strictly
decreasing and wj(·) : [p,∞) → (−∞, wj(p)] is onto, χj,p(λ) is uniquely
defined for all λ ≥ 1 and strictly increasing. Because wj(p)− log λ ↓ −∞ as
λ ↑ ∞, limλ↑∞ χj,p(λ) =∞.
(ii): Note that
euj(χj,p(λ)) = ewj(χj,p(λ))+vj = ewj(p)−log λ+vj = λ−1
(
ewj(p)+vj
)
.
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Thus if ϑ = −∞,
PLj (χp(λ)) =
euj(χj,pk (λ))∑J
k=1 e
uk(χk,pk (λ))
=
λ−1ewj(pj)+vj
λ−1
∑J
k=1 e
wk(pk)+vk
= PLj (p).
(iii): Similarly, if ϑ > −∞,
PLj (χp(λ)) =
euj(χj,pk (λ))
eϑ +
∑J
k=1 e
uk(χk,pk (λ))
=
ewj(pj)+vj
λeϑ +
∑J
k=1 e
wk(pk)+vk
< PLj (p)
for all λ > 1 and PLj (χp(λ))→ 0 as λ→∞. 
The invariance of the Logit choice probabilities over sequences of prices
that tend to infinity should be viewed as an unacceptable property for re-
alistic market models.7 Individuals are sure to make purchasing decisions
based on the absolute value of product prices, rather than just the relative
value. It is easy also fairly easy to see that Lemma 3.2, (iv) extends beyond
Logit to any Generalized Extreme Value model without an outside good.
The following form for the price derivatives of the Logit choice probabil-
ities is also required.
Lemma 3.3. If w satisfies Assm. 3.1 (b), then PL is continuously differ-
entiable for all p ∈ (0,∞)J with
(6) (DkP
L
j )(p) = P
L
j (p)(δj,k − P
L
k (p))(Dwk)(pk) = (δj,k − P
L
j (p))λk(p)
where λk(p) = (Dwk)(pk)P
L
k (p). In other words,
(7)
(DfP
L
f )(p) =
(
I−PLf (p)1
⊤
)
Λf (p) and (DP
L)(p) =
(
I−PL(p)1⊤
)
Λ(p)
where Λf (p) = diag(λf (p)) and Λ(p) = diag(λ(p)). When w is twice
differentiable on (0,∞), PL is as well and the second derivatives of the
Logit choice probabilities are given by
(8)
(DlDkP
L
j )(p) = δk,l
(
(D2wk)(pk) + (Dwk)(pk)
2
)
PLk (p)
(
δj,k − P
L
j (p)
)
+ λk(p)
(
2PLj (p)− δj,k − δj,l
)
λl(p).
Proof. These follow directly from Eqn. (5). 
3.3. Bounded and Vanishing Logit Profits. An understanding of when
profits are bounded over the set of all non-negative prices is a pre-requisite
to a general analysis of profit-optimal prices and corresponding price equi-
librium. One might expect that because Assumption 3.1 (c) implies that
the choice probabilities vanish as prices increase without bound that profits
should also, but this is not true: w(y, p) = −α log p, a specification derived
by Allenby & Rossi to represent “asymmetric brand switching under price
7Mizuno [30] makes explicit use of this unrealistic property in proving the existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium prices under Logit with single-product firms and linear in
price utilities.
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changes” [2], can generate unbounded profits even though the choice prob-
abilities vanish. The following property of utility functions guarantees not
only the finiteness of Logit profits, but that these profits vanish as prices
increase without bound.8
Definition 3.4. w is eventually log bounded at y ∈ Y if there exists some
r(y) > 1, κ(y), and some p¯(y) ∈ [0,∞) such that w(y, p) ≤ −r(y) log p +
κ(y) for all p > p¯(y). w itself is eventually log bounded if w is eventually
log bounded at all y ∈ Y.
Note that if w is eventually log bounded then Assumption 3.1 (c) nec-
essarily holds. Furthermore, if w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly
then the fundamental theorem of calculus implies that w is also eventu-
ally log bounded. Appendix B contains a somewhat pathological example
demonstrating that the converse need not hold.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose w satisfies Assumption 3.1. (i) Let ϑ > −∞, q ∈
[0,∞]J , and suppose that there exists r : Y → [1,∞), p¯ : Y → [0,∞),
and κ : Y → R such that w(y, p) ≤ −r(y) log p + κ(y) for all p > p¯(y).
Then limp→q πˆf (p) < ∞. (ii) If in fact w is eventually log bounded, i.e.
r(y) : Y → (1,∞), then limp→q πˆf (p) = 0 if qf = ∞.
Proof. The following inequality always holds:
PLj (p)pj ≤
euj(pj)
eϑ + euj(pj)
pj =
ewj(pj)+vj−ϑ
1 + ewj(pj)+vj−ϑ
pj = pje
wj(pj)+vj−ϑ.
Under the hypothesis of (i),
PLj (p)pj ≤ p
1−rj
j e
κj+vj−ϑ ≤ eκj+vj−ϑ
for all pj sufficiently large. Claim (i) is a consequence of this bound. More-
over, rj < 1 for all j, then P
L
j (p)pj ↓ 0 as pj ↑ ∞. Claim (ii) is a conse-
quence. 
Appendix B contains an example demonstrating that the converse to the
second claim is false. That is, bounded and vanishing Logit profits need
not imply that w is eventually log bounded. If eventual log boundedness is
strongly violated in the sense of the hypothesis in the following lemma, then
profits must increase without bound as prices do.
Lemma 3.5. Let ϑ > −∞ and Assumption 3.1 hold. Suppose that for some
y∗ ∈ Y there exists r(y∗) ∈ (0, 1), κ(y∗), and p¯ ∈ [0,∞) such that for all
p > p¯, w(y∗, p) ≥ −r log p + κ(y∗). Suppose further that yj = y∗ for some
j ∈ Jf . Then limp→q πˆf (p) =∞ for any q ∈ [0,∞]
J with qj =∞.
8The constant κ(y) is convenient, but not necessary; it is easy to show that w is
eventually log bounded with (r(y), p¯(y), κ(y)) where κ(y) 6= 0 if and only if it is so with
some (r′(y), p¯′(y), 0).
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Proof. Under the hypothesis, pje
uj(pj) ≥ (pj)
1−reκ+vj for all sufficiently
large pj . Thus pje
uj(pj) → ∞ as pj ↑ ∞ because r < 1. Clearly then
PLj (pj,p−j)pj →∞ as pj ↑ ∞. The claim follows. 
The results above establish when optimal profits are positive and finite,
and when profit-optimal prices are not all infinite. Showing that profit max-
imizing prices are all finite is proved in Section 4 with the slightly strength-
ened hypothesis that w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly.
Lemma 3.6. Suppose w satisfies Assumption 3.1 and is eventually log
bounded. (i) If ϑ > −∞ and pf ∈ [0,∞]
Jf locally maximizes πˆf (·,p−f )
for any p−f ∈ [0,∞]
J−f , then pf 6= ∞. (ii) If ϑ = −∞ and pf ∈ [0,∞]
Jf
locally maximizes πˆf (·,p−f ) for any p−f ∈ [0,∞]
J−f \ {∞}, then pf 6= ∞.
However, πˆf (·,∞) is maximized only by pf = ∞, and thus ∞ is always an
equilibrium.
Proof. (i): Profit maximizing prices pf are not all infinite because πˆf (∞,p−f ) =
0, and any prices pf > cf give πˆf (p) > 0. (ii): The same holds when
ϑ = −∞ and p−f 6= ∞, because some product’s utility is finite. However,
if p−f = ∞, Lemma 3.2 proves that
πˆf (χf,pf (λ),∞) = P
L
f (χf,p(λ),∞)
⊤(χf,pf (λ)− cf ) = P
L
f (pf ,∞)
⊤(χf,pf (λ)− cf )→∞
as λ ↑ ∞, for any finite pf . 
4. Equilibrium Prices Under Logit Models
This section proves the following theorem regarding equilibrium prices for
Bertrand competition under the Logit model as described in Sections 2-3:
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1 holds, w eventually
decreases sufficiently quickly (Defn. 3.2) and w has sub-quadratic second
derivatives (Defn. 3.3). There is at least one equilibrium p, and any equi-
librium satisfies c < p < ∞.
For further clarity, the key results for both profit maximization and equi-
librium problems are outlined with their assumptions in Tables 1 and 2.
Three fixed-point characterizations are applied to prove Theorem 4.1.
One fixed-point characterization is a generalization of existing results, while
two are apparently novel. The first of these novel characterizations states
that markups are equal to profits plus the (local) willingness to pay for
product value. In essence, this equation is derived by factoring out the gra-
dient of the “inclusive value,” or expected maximum utility, from (∇˜πˆ)(p).
This new fixed-point equation also proves that multi-product firm optimal
pricing problems under Logit are always “one-parameter” problems. Specifi-
cally, all profit-maximizing prices are determined uniquely from a knowledge
of profits a single price. This observation yields our second novel fixed-point
characterization, a “reduced-form” characterization in terms of equilibrium
profits alone.
16 W. ROSS MORROW AND STEVEN J. SKERLOS
Table 1. Assumptions required for important profit maxi-
mizations results.
Stationarity is necessary Assumption 3.1
Stationarity is sufficient Assumption 3.1, Defn. 3.3
Optimal profits are finite Defn. 3.4
Profit-maximizing prices are finite ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1, Defn. 3.2
Profit-maximizing prices are unique ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1, Defn. 3.2, Defn. 3.3
Table 2. Assumptions required for important equilibrium results.
Simultaneous stationarity is necessary Assumption 3.1
Simultaneously stationary prices are local equilibria Assumption 3.1, Defn. 3.3
Simultaneously stationary prices exist ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1, Defn. 3.2
Local equilibria are equilibria Assumption 3.1, Defn. 3.3
As is common in theoretical economics, the proof has two parts: First, the
existence of simultaneously stationary prices is proved, followed by a proof
that simultaneously stationary prices are equilibria. The most general proof
of the existence of finite simultaneously stationary prices is accomplished
using the Poincare-Hopf theorem [29, 47]. Brouwer’s theorem can also be
applied under stronger assumptions. Proving that simultaneously stationary
prices are in fact equilibria is somewhat more involved. In the past appeals
to quasi-concavity have been used to prove that profits have unique maximiz-
ers (see, e.g., [15]). While the multi-product firm Logit profit functions are
not quasi-concave [22], under utilities with sub-quadratic second derivatives
first-order stationarity of profits in fact implies local concavity, the second-
order sufficiency condition. A distinct application of the Poincare-Hopf the-
orem then implies that Logit profits have unique stationary points which
must be unique global profit maximizers for fixed competitor’s prices, effec-
tively circumventing the difficulties with profits that are not quasi-concave.
Note that while this argument establishes that simultaneously stationary
prices are equilibria, it does not necessarily imply that equilibria are unique.
The analysis in this section concerning models with constant unit costs and
no finite limit on purchasing power serves as a prototype for the analysis of
the more general cases presented in Sections 5 and 6.
4.1. Fixed-Point Characterizations of Price Equilibrium. This sec-
tion characterizes simultaneous stationarity in terms of fixed-point equa-
tions.
4.1.1. The BLP Markup Equation. One fixed-point characterization is de-
rived by noting that
(DfPf )(p)
⊤ = Λf (p)(I − 1Pf (p)
⊤)
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and hence (∇f πˆf )(p) = 0 for p ∈ (0,∞)
J if, and only if,
(9) (I− 1Pf (p)
⊤)(pf − cf ) = −(Dfwf)(pf )
−11.
This is a direct generalization of the fixed-point equations derived under
“constant coefficient” linear in price utility (i.e., w(y, p) = −αp for some
α > 0) for single-product firms by Anderson & de Palma [3] and for multi-
product firms by Besanko et al [12].
The following statements formalize this result.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose w satisfies Assumption 3.1. (i) (I − 1PLf (p)
⊤)−1
exists whenever ϑ > −∞ or, if ϑ = −∞, when p−f 6= ∞, but not otherwise.
(ii) If pf ∈ (0,∞)
Jf locally maximizes πˆf (·,p−f ), then pf = cf + ηf (p)
where
(10) ηf (p) = −(I− 1P
L
f (p)
⊤)−1(Dwf )(pf )
−11.
(iii) If p ∈ (0,∞)J is a local equilibrium, then p = c+ η(p) where
(11) ηf (p) = −(Dwf )(pf )
−11−
(
PLf (p)
⊤(Dwf )(pf )
−11
1−PLf (p)
⊤1
)
1
(iv) For any p ∈ (0,∞)J , ηf (p) > 0 and ηf (p) > 0. As a consequence,
equilibrium prices have positive markups.
The fixed-point equation in (iii) is a specialization of the “markup” equa-
tion Eqn. (??) popularized for Mixed Logit models by Berry, Levinsohn, &
Pakes [10]; see also [31, 33].
Proof. (i): The Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula for the inverse of a
rank-one perturbation of the identity [39, Chapter 2, pg. 50] implies that
(12)
(
I− 1PLf (p)
⊤
)−1
= I+
(
1
1−PLf (p)
⊤1
)
1PLf (p)
⊤;
so long as PLf (p)
⊤1 < 1. This last condition will hold if either ϑ > −∞ or,
if ϑ = −∞, p−f 6= ∞.
(ii): We can write
(∇f πˆf )(p) = Λf (p)
(
(I − 1PLf (p)
⊤)(pf − cf ) + (Dfwf )(pf )
−11
)
.
Stationarity then requires (I − 1PLf (p)
⊤)(pf − cf ) + (Dfwf )(pf )
−11 = 0.
(iii) is a consequence of (ii).
(iv): Eqn. (12) proves that ηf (p) > 0 so long as (Dwj)(pj) < 0. 
4.1.2. A New Equation. Another fixed-point characterization follows by mul-
tiplying pf − cf through I− 1Pf (p)
⊤, instead of inverting I− 1Pf (p)
⊤ as
a whole, yielding
pf − cf = πˆf (p)1− (Dfwf )(pf )
−11
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1Pf (p)
⊤ could be considered the “contractive” part of (I − 1Pf (p)
⊤) be-
cause ||1Pf (p)
⊤||∞ = ||Pf (p)||1 < 1.
This derivation proves the following result.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose w satisfies Assumption 3.1 (a) and (b). Define ζ :
(0,∞)J → RJ by ζ(p) = π˜(p) − (Dw)(p)−11 where π˜(p) ∈ RJ is the
vector with components (π˜(p))j = πˆf(j)(p). ζ has components ζj(p) =
πˆf (p) − (Dwj)(pj)
−1 where j ∈ Jf , and “intra-firm” components ζf (p) =
πˆf (p)1− (Dwf )(pf )
−11.
(i) For any p ∈ (0,∞)J , (∇f πˆf )(p) = Λf (p)ϕf (p) and (∇˜πˆ)(p) =
Λ(p)ϕ(p) where
(13) ϕf (p) = pf − cf − ζf (p) and ϕ(p) = p− c− ζ(p).
(ii) If pf ∈ (0,∞)
Jf locally maximizes πˆf (·,p−f ), then ϕf (p) = 0; i.e.,
pf = cf + ζf (pf ,p−f ). (iii) If p ∈ (0,∞)
J is a local equilibrium, then
ϕ(p); i.e. p = c+ ζ(p).
In Appendix B, Eqn. (13) is used to show that profits under Logit with
w(y, p) = −α log p, a model first posed by Allenby & Rossi [2], have no
finite profit-maximizing prices when α ≤ 1. Sandor [45] has also made
this observation. Notably, Allenby & Rossi do undertake price optimization
exercises. Such exercises thus rely on estimating a coefficient α that is
statistically significantly strictly greater than one, a question not addressed
in [2].
Positivity and finiteness of equilibrium prices can be considered important
regularity properties, and follow from the ζ characterization.
Lemma 4.4. Suppose w satisfies Assumption 3.1, w eventually decreases
sufficiently quickly, and either ϑ > −∞ or p−f 6= ∞ if ϑ = −∞. Then no
pf with some pj < cj or pj =∞ maximizes πˆf (·,p−f ).
Proof. Lemma 4.2, (iv), proves that pj > cj if pj 6= 0. We complete the
claim by proving that no price pj = 0 in equilibrium. For pj > 0, the profit
derivatives are
(Dj πˆf )(p) = λj(p)(pj − cj − πˆf (p)) + P
L
j (p) = λj(p)(pj − cj − ζj(p))
If limp↓0(Dwj)(p) = 0, then the first equation here proves that limpj↓0(Dj πˆf )(p) =
PLj (p) > 0, and thus pj = 0 cannot be profit-maximizing. If limp↓0(Dwj)(p) >
0, (Dj πˆf )(p) ≤ 0 if, and only if, pj−cj−ζj(p) ≥ 0. As pj ↓ 0, pj−cj−ζj(p) ≥
0 if, and only if,
−πˆf(p) ≥ (1 − P
L
j (p))cj +
1
|(Dwj)(pj)|
.
Because profit-optimal prices are positive, the left hand side is negative
while the right hand side is positive. By contradiction, pj = 0 cannot be
profit-maximizing. The finiteness of equilibrium prices follows from Lemma
4.10. 
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4.1.3. A Single-Parameter Equation. The ζ characterization also illustrates
that price equilibrium problems with the Logit model and constant unit
costs are “single-parameter problems.” Define ψj(p) = p− cj +(Dwj)(p)
−1,
and write pj = cj + ζj(p) as ψj(pj) = πˆf (p). Note that for fixed f , the
right hand side of this equation is the same for all j ∈ Jf . Thus if the
right hand side is known and ψj is invertible, all prices are uniquely defined.
Conversely if a single price is known the right hand side can be computed,
thus generating all prices.
The following characteristics of the maps ψj : [cj ,∞) → [0,∞) formalize
this logic.
Lemma 4.5. Suppose Assumption 3.1 holds. (i) ψj(cj) < 0. (ii) If w also
eventually decreases sufficiently quickly, then ψj(p) → ∞ as p → ∞. (iii)
Finally, ψj is differentiable and strictly increasing if, and only if, w is twice
differentiable and has sub-quadratic second derivatives.
Proof. (i): ψj(cj) = (Dwj)(cj)
−1 < 0. (ii): By assumption, there exists
some rj > 1 and p¯j > 0 such that (Dwj)(pj)
−1 ≥ −rj/pj for all pj ≥ p¯j.
Then
ψj(pj) = pj − cj +
1
(Dwj)(pj)
≥
(
1−
1
rj
)
pj − cj → 0 as pj ↑ ∞.
(iii): ψj is continuously differentiable if wj is twice continuously differen-
tiable and strictly decreasing. Specifically, (Dψj)(p) = 1− ωj(p), and ψj is
increasing if, and only if, w has sub-quadratic second derivatives. 
Corollary 4.6. Let w satisfy Assumption 3.1, eventually decrease suffi-
ciently quickly, and be twice continuously differentiable with sub-quadratic
second derivatives. Then for all j the equation ψj(p) = π has a unique
solution Ψj(π) > cj for any π > 0.
Equilibrium prices under Logit models can thus be characterized in terms
of a fixed-point equation for equilibrium profits alone. Let Ψ : PF →∏J
j=1[cj ,∞) be defined component-wise by (Ψ(π))j = Ψj(πf(j)), where
π ∈ PF and f(j) ∈ {1, . . . , F} denotes the (unique) index of the firm
offering product j. Next, let πˆ :
∏J
j=1[cj ,∞) → P
F have profits πˆf as
component functions; i.e. πˆf : P
J → R. Equilibrium profits satisfy the
fixed-point equation
π = πˆ(Ψ(π)) = (πˆ ◦Ψ)(π) = φ(π).
Given any such fixed-point π, all equilibrium prices can be recovered by
evaluating Ψ.
4.2. Existence of Simultaneously Stationary Prices. This section pro-
vides three proofs of the existence of simultaneously stationary prices using
each of the fixed-point characterizations given above. Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem is the typical tool, and is used for proofs based on the η and φ
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characterizations. However the most general result applies the ζ charac-
terization and the Poincare-Hopf theorem. Throughout this section it is
assumed that ϑ > −∞.
4.2.1. A proof based on the η map. Brouwer’s theorem can be applied to
the η characterization. First recall that η(p) ≥ 0. Next, assume that
τ = supp∈(0,∞)||η(p)||∞ < ∞; conditions for this are given below. It then
follows that c + η(p) maps [c, τ1] ⊂ RJ , a compact convex set, into itself.
Since c+ η(·) is also continuous, Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem implies the
existence of a fixed-point p = c+ η(p).
Lemma 4.7. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1 holds, and w is concave in
price. Then τ <∞.
Proof. Because ||(I − 1PLf (p)
⊤)−1||∞ ≤ (1− ||P
L
f (p)||1)
−1, the bound
||ηf (p)||∞ =
maxj∈Jf |(Dwj)(pj)|
−1
1−
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)
controls the growth in η. If w satisfies Assumption 3.1 and is concave in
price, then |(Dwj)(pj)|
−1 ≤ |(Dwj)(cj)|
−1 for all pj ≥ cj . This implies that
maxj∈Jf |(Dwj)(pj)|
−1 is bounded over pf ∈ [cf ,∞) ⊂ R
Jf . If ϑ > −∞,
supp∈(0,∞)(
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)) < 1 for all f . Under these assumptions, τ <
∞. 
Corollary 4.8. If ϑ > −∞ and w satisfies Assumption 3.1 and is concave
in price, then there exists a fixed-point p = c+ η(p).
4.2.2. A proof based on φ. Section 4.1 defined simultaneously stationary
profits as a fixed-point of the map φ = πˆ ◦ Ψ. This characterization and
Brouwer’s theorem can be used to prove the existence of simultaneously
stationary prices.
Lemma 4.9. Suppose w satisfies Assumption 3.1, eventually decreases suf-
ficiently quickly, has sub-quadratic second derivatives and ϑ > −∞. Then
there exists at least one fixed-point π = φ(π).
Proof. Ψj can be continuously extended to [0,∞] as Ψj(∞) = ∞ under
the condition that w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly. Because w
is then also eventually log bounded, letting ϑ > −∞ ensures that for any
f , πˆf (p) < ∞ for all p ∈ [0,∞]
J . Thus φ is continuous and maps the
compact, convex set [0,∞]J strictly into itself. By Brouwer’s fixed-point
theorem, there exists a fixed-point π on [0,∞]F . Furthermore, this fixed-
point has no infinite components, by Lemma 3.6. 
While the restriction ϑ > −∞ could be removed through an application
of Kakutani’s extension of Brouwer’s theorem [25, 15], the fact that ∞ is
always an equilibrium makes this approach uninformative.
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4.2.3. A proof based on the ζ map. The Poincare-Hopf theorem requires
that sum of the indices of the vector field ϕ(p) = p − c − ζ(p) over all
zeros of ϕ equals one, so long as ϕ points outward on the boundary of some
compact hyper-rectangle [c, p¯] ⊂ PJ for some p¯ < ∞. Particularly, this
sum of indices cannot be empty and hence there must be at least one zero
of ϕ, and thus at least one simultaneously stationary point.
The hypotheses required in the Poincare-Hopf Theorem follow from the
next lemma.
Lemma 4.10. Suppose ϑ > −∞ and w satisfies Assumption 3.1. (i) If
p ≥ c and pj = cj, ϕj(p) < 0. (ii) If w eventually decreases sufficiently
quickly, there exists some p¯ ∈ (c,∞) such that ϕj(p) > 0 whenever pj ≥ p¯j ,
regardless of p−j .
Proof. (i): When p ≥ c and pj = cj,
pj − cj − ζj(p) = −πˆf (pf ,p−f )−
1
|(Dwj)(cj)|
< 0.
(ii): Observe that the following bound is valid for large enough pj because
w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly:
pj − cj − ζj(p) ≥
(
1−
1
rj
)
pj − (cj + πˆf (pf ,p−f )).
Because πˆf (·,p−f ) is bounded (w is eventually log bounded), and rj > 1,
(1−1/rj)pj →∞ as pj →∞, pj can always be chosen large enough to make
pj − cj − ζj(p) > 0. When ϑ > −∞, πˆf (·) itself is bounded and hence p¯f
can be chosen independently of p−f . 
Theorem 4.11. Suppose ϑ > −∞, w satisfies Assumption 3.1 and eventu-
ally decreases sufficiently quickly. There exists at least one p ∈ (c,∞) such
that p = c+ ζ(p).
Proof. Let p¯ be as in Lemma 4.10. ϕ(p) is a vector field on [c, p¯] that points
outward on the boundary of [c, p¯]. Let the set of zeros of ϕ be denoted by
Z = {p ∈ (c, p¯) : ϕ(p) = 0} and let indexp(ϕ) denote the index of ϕ at
p ∈ Z. The Poincare-Hopf Theorem states that
∑
p∈Z indexp(ϕ) = 1, where
the value of the sum on the left is taken to be 0 if Z = {∅}. Hence there is
at least one zero of ϕ. 
Note that it is not required that w be concave in price or have sub-
quadratic second derivatives in order for simultaneously stationary prices to
exist.
Lemma 4.10 also shows that c + ζ(·) maps [c, p¯ + ǫ] into itself, for any
ǫ ≥ 0. Thus Brouwer’s Theorem could be applied just as easily to achieve
this existence result. This is not the case in Section 5 below, however.
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4.3. Sufficiency of Stationarity. A general approach to multi-product
firm equilibrium problems can rely on quasi-concavity to establish the unique-
ness of profit-maximizing prices [22]. However, something like quasi-concavity
is required to be able to connect fixed-points pf = cf +ζf (p) to profit max-
imizers, and thus fixed-points p = c+ ζ(p) to local equilibria. Furthermore,
uniqueness of profit maximizing prices is required to ensure the existence of
equilibria proper.
Logit profits have the surprising property that stationarity, the first-order
necessary condition, implies local concavity, the second-order sufficient con-
dition when w has sub-quadratic second derivatives. The Poincare-Hopf
theorem again serves to commute this local result on the second derivatives
of profits to a global property, the uniqueness of profit-maximizing prices.
Lemma 4.12. Suppose ϑ > −∞ and w satisfies Assumption 3.1 and has
sub-quadratic second derivatives. (i) Satisfaction of the first-order condition
(∇f πˆf )(pf ,p−f ) = 0 is sufficient for pf ∈ (0,∞) ⊂ R
Jf to be a local maxi-
mizer of πˆf (·,p−f ). (ii) Satisfaction of the simultaneous stationarity condi-
tion (∇˜πˆ)(p) = 0 is sufficient for p ∈ (0,∞) ⊂ RJ to be a local equilibrium.
(iii) If, in addition, w also eventually decreases sufficiently quickly then
there is a unique stationary point that is a finite maximizer of πˆf (·,p−f ).
(iv) When w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly, the simultaneous sta-
tionarity condition (∇˜πˆ)(p) = 0 is sufficient for p ∈ (0,∞) ⊂ RJ to be an
equilibrium.
Proof. Claim (ii) is an obvious corollary to (i), and claim (iv) is an obvious
corollary to (iii).
Claim (i) is a consequence of the following componentwise formula for
the intra-firm profit price-Hessians (Df∇f πˆf )(p) when pf makes πˆf (·,p−f )
stationary: for k, l ∈ Jf ,
(DlDkπˆ
L
f )(p) = (Dkλk)(p)ϕk(p) + λk(p)(Dlϕk)(p)
= λk(p)
(
δk,l − (Dlπˆf )(p) − ωk(pk)δk,l
)
= λk(p)(1 − ωk(pk))δk,l
In matrix form,
(Df∇f πˆf )(p) = Λf (p)(I −Ωf (pf ))
whereΩf (pf ) is a diagonal matrix with entries ωj(pj) = (D
2wj)(pj)/(Dwj)(pj)
2.
Thus, the Hessians are diagonal matrices with negative diagonal entries when
w has sub-quadratic second derivatives and πˆf (·,p−f ) is locally concave at
any stationary prices.
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Claim (iii) is a consequence of the Poincare-Hopf Theorem: Because
πˆf (·,p−f ) is maximized at pf = cf + ζf (p),
(−1)Jf = indexpf ((∇f πˆf )(·,p−f )) = sign det(Df∇f πˆf )(p)
= sign detΛf (p) · sign det(Dfϕf )(p) = (−1)
Jf · sign det(Dfϕf )(p);
see Chapter 6 in [29] for some of the basic results invoked here. Because of
these equalities,
indexpf (ϕf (·,p−f )) = sign det(Dfϕf )(p) = 1.
But the Poincare-Hopf theorem require the sum of indices of all zeros of
ϕf (·,p−f ) over [cf , p¯f ] to be 1. The zero must, therefore, be unique. 
5. Quantity-Dependent Unit Costs
Much of the theoretical literature allows unit costs to depend on sales
volumes. This section extends the techniques used in the previous section
to this case.
Specifically, the analysis in this section proves the following theorem:
Theorem 5.1. Let ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1 holds with a w that eventually
decreases sufficiently quickly with sub-quadratic second derivatives, and total
costs satisfy Assumption 5.1. Then there exists a vector of equilibrium prices
p satisfying c(P(p)) < p < ∞, and no equilibrium prices that do not satisfy
these bounds.
5.1. Assumptions. Assumption 2.3 restricted attention to constant unit
costs for the following reason: Suppose that unit costs did depend on the
quantity sold, and let cUf (yj , Qj(Y,p)) give the unit costs to firm f for
offering product yj in the market of products with characteristics Y, prices
p, and resultant demand Qj(Y,p). Then firm f ’s random profits are
Πf (Y,p) = Qf (Y,p)
⊤(pf − c
U
f (Yf ,Qf (Y,p))) − c
F
f (Yf ).
Notice that profits are no longer a linear function of the demands, and thus
expected profits need not be a linear function of the expected demands.
Computing these expected costs could be quite difficult, as this would involve
sums over the space of realizable demands.
One way to relax the assumption that unit costs do not depend on pro-
duction volume without overly complicating the resulting equilibrium con-
ditions is to suppose that firms decide on pricing based on the total costs
corresponding to expected demands, as opposed to the actual expected total
costs. The following assumption then generalizes Assumption 2.3 to unit
costs that may depend on the quantity sold:
Assumption 5.1. Firm f has a normalized cost function Cf : Y × [0, 1]→
[0,∞) so that the total cost of offering a product with characteristics y ∈ Y
for any demand q is ICf (y, q/I), where again I is the market size. As-
sume also that for any y ∈ Y, Cf (y, ·) : [0, 1] → R is twice continuously
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differentiable, strictly increasing and convex on [0, 1), Cf (y, 0) = 0, and
supP∈[0,1] cf (y, P ) <∞ where cf (y, P ) = (D
PCf )(y, P ).
The simplest example is, of course, Cf (y, P ) = c
U
f (y)P as studied in
Sections 2-4. Given Yf ∈ Y
Jf , define Cj : [0, 1] → [0,∞) by Cj(P ) =
Cf (yj , P ) and cj(P ) = (DCf )(yj , P ) where the derivative is with respect to
P .
Under Assumption 5.1, firms choose prices by solving
maximize EΠf (p) = I
∑
j∈Jf
(
PLj (p)pj−Cj(E[Qj(p)]/I)
)
with respect to pj ∈ Jf
equivalent to
(14)
maximize πˆf (p) =
∑
j∈Jf
(
PLj (p)pj−Cj(P
L
j (p))
)
with respect to pj ∈ Jf
The following observation is an extension of Lemma 3.6.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1 holds with a w that is
eventually log bounded, and Assumption 5.1 holds. For any p−f , the optimal
profits for Prob. (14) are positive and finite.
Proof. Note that, for any j,
lim
pj↑∞
(
Cj(P
L
j (p))
PLj (p)
)
= lim
pj↑∞
(
cj(P
L
j (p))(DjP
L
j )(p)
(DjPLj )(p)
)
= cj(0) <∞
by L’Hopital’s rule. Thus, as pj ↑ ∞, pj − Cj(P
L
j (p))/P
L
j (p) → ∞. Thus
for all j, pj can be chosen large enough so that pj −Cj(P
L
j (p))/P
L
j (p) > 0.
Writing
πˆf (p) =
∑
j∈Jf
(
PLj (p)pj − Cj(P
L
j (p))
)
=
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)
(
pj −
Cj(P
L
j (p))
PLj (p)
)
proves that there exists pf , for any p−f such that πˆf (pf ,p−f ) > 0. If w is
eventually log bounded, then Pj(p)(pj −Cj(P
L
j (p))/P
L
j (p))→ 0 as pj ↑ ∞.
Because πˆf (pf ,p−f ) → 0 as pf → ∞, and πˆf (pf ,p−f ) is finite if pj < ∞
for any j ∈ Jf , optimal profits are finite. 
Note that this proof does not say that all prices are finite; this is proved
below using similar techniques to those used in Section 4.
5.2. Stationarity. The stationarity conditions for Prob. (14) are
(Dkπˆf )(p) =
∑
j∈Jf
(DkP
L
j )(p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) + P
L
k (p) = 0
for all k ∈ Jf and all f , as can be checked.
As before, stationarity can be written in either of two fixed-point forms:
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Lemma 5.3. Suppose ϑ > −∞ and Assumptions 3.1 and 5.1 hold. At any
simultaneously stationary prices p ∈ (0,∞)J , p = c(P(p)) + η(p) where
η is as defined above and p = c(P(p)) + ζ(p) where ζ : [0,∞)J → RJ is
defined componentwise by
ζk(p) =
∑
j∈Jf(k)
PLj (p)
(
pj − cj(P
L
j (p))
)
+
1
|(Dwk)(pk)|
As in Section 4, these characterizations immediately establishes the pos-
itivity of markups in equilibrium:
Lemma 5.4. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1 holds with w eventually
decreasing sufficiently quickly, and Assumption 5.1 holds. If p ∈ [0,∞]J is
a vector of equilibrium prices, then c(P(p)) < p < ∞.
Proof. Lemma 5.6 below proves that there exists some p¯j such that πˆf (p) <
0 whenever pj > p¯j. Thus no price can be infinite in equilibrium. Moreover,
no price can be zero: Suppose limpk↓0(Dwk)(pk) = 0. Then for pk > 0,
(Dkπˆf )(p) = (Dwk)(pk)P
L
k (p)

pk − ck − ∑
j∈Jf(k)
PLj (p)
(
pj − cj(P
L
j (p))

+PLk (p)→ PLk (p) > 0
as pk ↓ 0. Now suppose limpk↓0(Dwk)(pk) < 0. For p with 0 < pk < ∞,
(Dkπˆf )(p) ≤ 0 if, and only if,
pk − ck(P
L
k (p)))−
∑
j∈Jf(k)
PLj (p)
(
pj − cj(P
L
j (p))
)
−
1
|(Dwk)(pk)|
≥ 0.
Taking the limit as pk ↓ 0 yields
−
∑
j∈Jf(k)\k
PLj (p)
(
pj − cj(P
L
j (p))
)
≥ (1− PLk (p))ck(P
L
k (p))) +
1
|(Dwk)(0)|
.
The right hand side is positive, but if profits are optimal, the left hand side
is negative. Thus (Dkπˆf )(p) > 0 for all pk sufficiently close to zero and all
positive profits. Hence, pk = 0 cannot be profit-optimal.
Knowing then that p ∈ (0,∞)J , the equation p = c(P(p))+η(p) applies.
Because η(p) is positive valued for all p ∈ (0,∞)J , p > c(P(p)). 
The remainder of the proof of equilibrium existence is analogous to the
process for constant unit costs: First simultaneously stationary prices are
shown to exist, followed by a proof that such prices are in fact always equi-
librium prices.
5.3. Existence of Stationary Prices. The approach to establishing the
existence of simultaneously stationary points in the following lemmas is as
follows: First, a homeomorphism, ρ, between {p : p ≥ c(P(p))} and [0,∞
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is constructed. Second, the vector field ϕ : [0,∞) defined componentwise
by
ϕk(p) = pk − ck(P
L
k (p))−
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) −
1
|(Dwk)(pk)|
is transported from {p : p ≥ (DC)(P(p))} to [0,∞) by defining ψ :
[0,∞) → RJ by ψ(ǫ) = ϕ(ρ(ǫ)) for any ǫ ∈ [0,∞). Third, a compact
rectangle [0, ǫ¯] is constructed, on which ψ is continuous and points outward
on the boundary. The Poincare-Hopf theorem then proves the existence of
a zero ǫ0 ∈ (0, ǫ¯) for ψ, which maps to a zero p0 = ρ(ǫ0) of ϕ such that
p0 > (DC)(P(p0)). Such a point is necessarily simultaneously stationary
because (Dkπˆf )(p) = λk(p)ϕk(p).
Lemma 5.5. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1 holds with w eventually
decreasing sufficiently quickly, and Assumption 5.1 holds. The fixed-point
problem p = Fǫ(p) where Fǫ(p) = c(P(p))+ǫ has a unique solution ρ(ǫ) >
ǫ for every ǫ ∈ [0,∞) ⊂ RJ . Moreover, the corresponding solution map,
ρ : [0,∞) → {p : p ≥ c(P(p))} is a homeomorphism between [0,∞) and
{p : p ≥ c(P(p))}.
Proof. Suppose that c(P(p)) depends on p, otherwise the claims are trivial.
Assume the fixed-point ρ(ǫ) is unique. ρ(ǫ) > ǫ because cj(q) > 0 for
all q < 1 and PLj (p) < 1 for all p when there is an outside good. The
implicit function theorem guarantees the continuity of ρ(ǫ), and the inverse
map p 7→ ǫ = p− c(P(p)) is continuous because C and P are continuously
differentiable. ρ(ǫ) is thus a homeomorphism.
We now show that ρ(ǫ) does indeed exist, as claimed. Because supP∈[0,1] cj(P ) =
κj <∞, there are no fixed points with pj ≥ p¯j = κj+ǫj+δ for any fixed δ >
0. Moreover, there are no fixed points with pj = 0 when infp cj(P
L
j (p)) > 0;
this will hold when there is an outside good, even if cj(1) = 0, so long as
cj(P ) > 0 for all P ∈ [0, 1). Let D = [0, p¯], and consider
(DFǫ)(p) = (D
2C)(P(p))(DP)(p) = (D2C)(P(p))(I −P(p)1⊤)Λ(p)
(DFǫ)(p) has one as an eigenvalue only if there exists x 6= 0 such that
(D2C)(P(p))(I −P(p)1⊤)Λ(p)x = x.
When |λj(p)| (D
2Cj)(P
L
j (p)) 6= −1 for all j, this holds only if
J∑
j=1
βj(p)P
L
j (p) = 1 where βj(p) =
|λj(p)| (D
2Cj)(P
L
j (p))
|λj(p)| (D2Cj)(PLj (p)) + 1
as can be checked. Clearly |λj(p)| (D
2Cj)(P
L
j (p)) 6= −1 and 0 ≤ βj(p) < 1
for all j when Cj is convex. Thus, when ϑ 6= −∞,
J∑
j=1
βj(p)P
L
j (p) <
J∑
j=1
βj(p)
(
euj(pj)∑J
k=1 e
uk(pk)
)
≤ max
j=1,...,J
βj(p) < 1.
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Thus (DFǫ)(p) cannot have 1 as an eigenvalue. By Kellogg’s Uniqueness
Theorem [26], ρ(ǫ) is well-defined. 
The assumption of convex costs Cj would be difficult to relax in this proof:
βj(p) cannot always be non-negative for concave costs such as Cj(P
L
j (p)) =
−κjP
L
j (p)
2 because |λj(p)| → 0 as pj ↑ ∞, and thus |λj(p)| κj ≤ 1 for
large enough pj. Bounding the sums of β’s in a similar way can be done if
we ensure that |λj(p)|
∣∣∣(D2Cj)(PLj (p))∣∣∣ > 1, but this suggests assumptions
that simultaneously restrict the behavior allowed in the utilities and costs.
Lemma 5.6. Suppose ϑ > −∞ and Assumptions 3.1 and 5.1 hold. (i) If
p ≥ c(P(p)) and pk = ck(P
L
k (p)), then ϕk(p) < 0. (ii) When w also even-
tually decreases sufficiently quickly, there exists p¯k > 0 such that ϕk(p) > 0
for all pk ≥ p¯k regardless of p−k.
Proof. (i) If p ≥ c(P(p)) and pk = ck(P
L
k (p)),
ϕk(p) = −
∑
j∈Jf\{k}
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p)))−
1
|(Dwk)(pk)|
< −
∑
j∈Jf\{k}
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) ≤ 0.
(ii) Write ϕk(p) > 0 as
pk −
1
|(Dwk)(pk)|
> ck(P
L
k (p)) +
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p)))(15)
Because there exists rk > 1 and p¯k such that
pk −
1
|(Dwk)(pk)|
≥
(
1−
1
rk
)
pk
for all pk > p¯k, the left-hand-side in (15) can be made as large as desired.
Similarly, because supq∈[0,1] cj(q) <∞ and wk is necessarily eventually log-
bounded, the right-hand-side
ck(P
L
k (p)) +
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) ≤ ck(P
L
k (p)) +
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)pj
is bounded over all p. Thus there must exist p¯k so large to make (15) hold
for all pk ≥ p¯k. 
Corollary 5.7. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1 holds with w eventually
decreasing sufficiently quickly, and Assumption 5.1 holds. ψ = ϕ ◦ ρ :
[0, p¯]→ RJ (i.e. ψ(ǫ) = ϕ(ρ(ǫ))) points outward on the boundary of [0, p¯].
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 5.6, recalling that ρk(ǫ) > p¯k
when ǫk = p¯k. 
Theorem 5.8. There exists a zero, p, of ϕ such that c(P(p)) < p < ∞.
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Proof. Apply the Poincare-Hopf theorem to ψ, as described above, to es-
tablish the existence of ǫ ∈ (0, p¯) such that ψ(ǫ) = 0. Define p = ρ(ǫ) >
c(P(p)), observing that ϕ(p) = ψ(ǫ) = 0. 
Note that the Poincare-Hopf Theorem is very useful here, relative to
Brouwer’s Theorem. Specifically, there is no obvious fixed-point equation
for ǫ, and it is not obvious when {p : p ≥ c(P(p))} (and thus {p : p ≥
c(P(p))} ∩ [0, p¯]) would be convex.
5.4. Existence of Equilibrium. The second component of the proof that
equilibrium exists requires demonstrating the “sufficiency of stationarity”
and the uniqueness of profit-maximizing prices. As in Section 4, this is
accomplished by proving that (Df∇f πˆf )(p) is negative definite at any sta-
tionary prices and then applying the Poincare-Hopf Theorem.
Lemma 5.9. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumption 3.1 holds with w twice contin-
uously differentiable, and Assumption 5.1 holds. At any stationary point,
(Df∇f πˆf )(p) = Λf (p)(I −Ωf (p))−Λf (p)Hf (p)Λf (p) where
Hf (p) = Kf (p)−Kf (p)P
L
f (p)1
⊤−1PLf (p)
⊤Kf (p)+
(
PLf (p)
⊤Kf (p)P
L
f (p)
)
11⊤
and Kf (p) = (D
2Cf )(P
L
f (p)).
Proof. Because (Dkπˆf )(p) = λk(p)ϕk(p) and ϕk(p) = 0 at any stationary
point, (DlDkπˆf )(p) = λk(p)(Dlϕk)(p) for any k, l ∈ Jf . Moreover,
(Dlϕk)(p) = (1− ωk(pk))δk,l − (D
2Ck)(P
L
k (p))(DlP
L
k )(p)
−
∑
j∈Jf
(DlP
L
j )(p))(pj − cj(P
L
j (p)) − P
L
l (p)
+
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)(D
2Cj)(P
L
j (p))(DlP
L
j )(p)
= (1− ωk(pk))δk,l − (D
2Ck)(P
L
k (p))(DlP
L
k )(p)
+
∑
j∈Jf
PLj (p)(D
2Cj)(P
L
j (p))(DlP
L
j )(p)
because (Dlπˆf )(p) =
∑
j∈Jf
(DlP
L
j )(p))(pj − cj(P
L
j (p)) − P
L
l (p) = 0. The
result follows by substituting the definition of (DlP
L
k )(p) into this last equa-
tion and re-arranging terms. 
A sufficient condition for πˆf (p) to be locally concave at any stationary
point follows:
Lemma 5.10. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumptions 3.1 and 5.1 hold, and w has
sub-quadratic second derivatives. (i) (Df∇f πˆf )(·,p−f ) is negative definite
at any stationary prices pf . (ii) As a consequence, profit-maximizing prices
pf are unique for any competitor’s prices p−f and (iii) any simultaneously
stationary point is an equilibrium.
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Proof. First note that if w has sub-quadratic second derivatives and Hf (p)
is positive semi-definite (at any stationary prices pf ) then (Df∇f πˆf )(p) is
negative definite (at any stationary prices pf ). For if w has sub-quadratic
second derivatives, then Λf (p)(I−Ωf (p)) is negative definite, and if Hf (p)
is positive semi-definite, then −Λf (p)Hf (p)Λf (p) is negative semi-definite.
We now show that when Cj is convex, Hf (p) is positive semi-definite. Be-
causeKf (p) is positive definite, define an inner product 〈x,y〉f = x
⊤Kf (p)y
on RJf with ||x||f =
√
〈x,x〉f the corresponding norm. The Cauchy-
Schwartz inequality states that(
Pf (p)
⊤Kf (p)x
)2
= |〈Pf (p),x〉f |
2 ≤ ||Pf (p)||
2
f ||x||
2
f =
(
Pf (p)
⊤Kf (p)Pf (p)
)(
x⊤Kf (p)x
)
for any vector x ∈ RJf . Note that
x⊤Hf (p)x =
(
Pf (p)
⊤Kf (p)Pf (p)
)(
1⊤x
)2
−2
(
Pf (p)
⊤Kf (p)x
)(
1⊤x
)
+x⊤Kf (p)x
Because any convex quadratic q(ξ) = aξ2 − 2bξ + c (i.e., where a > 0) is
minimized at ξ∗ = b/a with value q(ξ∗) = c− b
2/a, x⊤Hf (p)x ≥ 0 for all x
if (
Pf (p)
⊤Kf (p)x
)2
≤
(
Pf (p)
⊤Kf (p)Pf (p)
)(
x⊤Kf (p)x
)
for all x, which follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. Strictly speak-
ing, this inequality is only required for x satisfying 1⊤x = Pf (p)
⊤Kf (p)x/x
⊤Kf (p)x
to prove the positive semi-definiteness ofHf (p); however the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality requires this to hold for all x.
The discussion above proves that any vector of stationary prices pf is in
fact a local maximizer of firm f ’s profits; it remains to prove that this is fact
a unique, global maximizer of firm f ’s profits. The homotopic construction
in Lemma 5.5 applies equally well to a single firm, given fixed competitor
prices p−f . By the analogue of Lemma 5.6, the vector field ψf = ϕf ◦ ρf :
[0, p¯f ] → R
Jf points outward on the boundary of [0, p¯f ] and has at least
one zero ǫf . Assume that the index of any such zero is one. Then there
can be only one such zero, because the Poincare-Hopf Theorem requires the
sum of the indices of all zeros to be one.
The proof that the index of any zero ǫf of ψf is one begins with the
standard index formula:
indexǫf (ψf ) = sign det(Dfψf )(ǫf ) = sign det(Dfϕf )(ρf (ǫf ))·sign det(Dfρf )(ǫf ).
Both determinants on the right-hand-side are positive, as we now prove.
First, consider sign det(Dfϕf )(ρf (ǫf )). The zero pf = ρf (ǫf ) of ϕf (·,p−f )
is a local maximizer of πˆf (·,p−f ), and thus the index of the gradient vector
field (∇f πˆf )(·,p−f ) at pf is (−1)
Jf . But then
(−1)Jf = sign det(Df∇f πˆf ) = sign det
(
Λf (Dfϕf )
)
= (−1)Jf sign det(Dfϕf ),
and sign det(Dfϕf )(ρf (ǫf ),p−f ) = 1 as claimed.
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Next, consider sign det(Dfρf )(ǫf ). The Jacobian of (Dfρf )(ǫf ) is given
by
(Dρf )(ǫf ) = (I− (D
2Cf )(DfP
L
f ))
−1
(where we neglect the arguments for simplicity); this inverse is well defined
because (D2Cf )(DfP
L
f ) does not have one as an eigenvalue, as proved in
Lemma 5.5. Thus zero is not an eigenvalue of (Dfρf )(ǫf ), and any eigen-
value µ (6= 0) satisfies(
I− (D2Cf )(DfP
L
f )
)
x =
(
1
µ
)
x.
Rearranging this equation yields[(
1
µ
− 1
)
I+ (D2Cf)Λf
]
x =
(
1⊤Λfx
)
(D2Cf )P
L
f .
It is straightforward to see that this can hold only if
1 = θ
(
1−
1
µ
)
where θ(α) =
∑
j∈Jf
(
|λj| (D
2Cj)
α+ |λj| (D2Cj)
)
PLj .
Without loss of generality, suppose Jf = {1, . . . , Jf},
|λ1| (D
2C1) ≤ · · · ≤
∣∣λJf ∣∣ (D2CJf ),
let N be the number of distinct values of |λj | (D
2Cj), κ1 < · · · < κN these
values, and Mn be the number of j ∈ Jf for which |λj | (D
2Cj) = κn.
Note that θ is not defined for α ∈ Sf = {− |λj| (D
2Cj) : j ∈ Jf} =
{−κn}
N
n=1, and
Dθ(α) = −
∑
j∈Jf
(
|λj| (D
2Cj)
(α+ |λj| (D2Cj))2
)
PLj < 0,
when defined. Moreover, θ(α) < 0 < 1 for all α ∈ (−∞, κN ); thus no solu-
tions to θ(α) = 1 are less than −κN . Consider any interval (−κn+1,−κn),
n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. In such an interval θ is strictly decreasing, θ(α) ↑ ∞
as α ↓ −κn+1, and θ(α) ↓ −∞ as α ↑ −κn. There is thus a unique
αn ∈ (−κn+1,−κn) such that θ(αn) = 1. Finally, θ(α) > 0 for all α > −κ1,
Dθ(α) < 0 for all α > −κ1, and θ(0) =
∑
j∈Jf
PLj < 1 imply that there is a
unique αN ∈ (−κ1, 0) such that θ(αN ) = 1.
The N solutions to this equation map to the N distinct eigenvalues of
(Dfρf )(ǫf ) (with multiplicities Mn) via αn = 1− 1/µn; that is, µ = 1/(1−
αn). Because each αn < 0, each distinct eigenvalue of (Dfρf )(ǫf ) is positive.
Thus sign det(Dfρf )(ǫf ) = 1 as claimed. 
Consider this proof from the perspective of concave costs Cj .
x⊤Hf (p)x = −
(
Pf (p)
⊤ |Kf (p)|Pf (p)
)(
1⊤x
)2
+2
(
Pf (p)
⊤ |Kf (p)|x
)(
1⊤x
)
−x⊤ |Kf (p)| x
is now a concave quadratic in 1⊤x, q(ξ) = −aξ2 + 2bξ − c (where a, c >
0), maximized at ξ∗ = b/a with value q(ξ∗) = b
2/a − c. However, the
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Cauchy-Schwartz inequality then requires q(ξ) ≤ q(ξ∗) ≤ 0, and Hf (p)
is negative semi-definite. (Df∇f πˆf )(p) is negative definite then only if
Λf (p)(I − Ωf (p)) is “more” negative-definite than Λf (p)Hf (p)Λf (p) is,
in the sense that
x⊤Λf (p)(I −Ωf (p))x < x
⊤Λf (p)Hf (p)Λf (p)x.
6. Finite Purchasing Power
This section considers models in which there exists some limit on the
population’s purchasing power. That is, there exists ς ∈ [0,∞) such that
if pj ≥ ς, no individual can purchase product j. However, important em-
pirical examples of Mixed Logit models have finite purchasing power; see,
e.g., [10, 43]. Thus it is important to consider this case in the analysis of
existence and uniqueness of equilibrium prices. Section 4 above proves that
if ς = ∞ (no purchasing power limit) and there is an outside good, it is
not possible for any product’s price to be∞ in equilibrium. However, when
ς <∞, it is possible for some−but not all−prices to be equal to ς; in other
words, firms may “price some products out of the market”. Theoretical and
computational treatments must be specially adapted to this case to account
for this qualitatively different behavior.
The analysis in this section proves the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1. Suppose ϑ > −∞, costs satisfy Assumption 5.1 with (D2C)(y, P )
finite as P ↓ 0 for any y ∈ Y, and Assumption 6.1 holds with ς <∞ and a w
that eventually decreases sufficiently quickly, has finite sub-quadratic second
derivatives, and limp↑ς(D
2w)(y, p) exists for any y ∈ Y. Then there exists at
least one equilibrium p ∈ [0, ς]J , and any equilibrium satisfies p > c(P(p)).
6.1. Assumptions. Assumption 3.1 must be revised to account for finite
ς:
Assumption 6.1. There exists ς ∈ (c∗,∞], where c∗ = maxj{supP∈[0,1] cj(P )} <
∞, and functions w : Y× [0, ς)→ (−∞,∞) and v : Y → (−∞,∞) such that
the utility u : Y × [0,∞)→ R can be written u(y, p) = w(y, p) + v(y) for all
p < ς and u(y, p) = −∞ for all p ≥ ς. Moreover, assume that, for all y ∈ Y,
w(y, ·) : [0, ς) → (−∞,∞) is (a) strictly decreasing, and (b) continuously
differentiable, and (c) limp↑ς w(y, p) = −∞.
The basic properties so useful in the case of infinite purchasing power
must also be generalized:
Definition 6.1. If ς < ∞, w(y, ·) eventually decreases sufficiently
quickly if there exists δ(y) > 0 and α(y) > 1 such that (Dw)(y, p) ≤
−α(y)/(ς − p) for all p ∈ [ς − δ(y), ς).
Definition 6.2. w(y, ·) has sub-quadratic second derivatives if ω(y, p) <
1 for all p ∈ (0, ς).
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Gallego et. al [18] consider equilibrium pricing under the attraction de-
mand model, equivalent to the Logit model with nonlinear utilities, and
allow ς < ∞. Specifically, Gallego et. al formulate their model in terms
of the “attraction function” aj(p) = e
uj(p) and make what amount to the
following assumptions on uj : uj : [0, ς) → R is continuously differentiable,
strictly decreasing, and p(D2uj)(p) ≥ (Duj)(p). This last assumption is
violated by the “BLP”-type utility uj(p) = α log(ς − p)+ vj [10, 31, 33, 32],
as can be easily checked. Assumption 6.1 and Defs. 6.1 and 6.2 above are
weak enough to allow an analysis of this important case.
The following basic observations, stated without proof, are needed:
Lemma 6.2. Under Assumption 6.1 with ϑ > −∞ and ς <∞,
• PLj can be continuously extended to [0, ς]
J , with PLj (p) ↓ 0 as pj ↑ ς.
Specifically,
PLj (p) =
euj(pj)
eϑ +
∑
k:pk<ς
euk(pk)
• πˆf (p) can be continuously extended to [0, ς]
J , with πˆf (p) ↓ 0 as
pf ↑ ς1 with
πˆf (p) =
∑
j∈Jf ,pj<ς
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) and 0 < sup
pf∈[0,ς]
Jf
πˆf (p) <∞
• If w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly, λj(p) = (Dwj)(pj)P
L
j (p)
can be continuously extended to [0, ς]J with λj(p) ↑ 0 as pj ↑ ς.
If ϑ = −∞, PLj cannot be continuously extended to [0, ς]
J , for reasons
analogous to those discussed in Section 3.
The following consequences of Assumption 6.1 and Defs. 6.1 and 6.2 are
also used below.
Lemma 6.3. Suppose Assumption 6.1 holds with ς <∞. (i) If limp↑ς(Dw)(y, p)
exists, then (Dw)(y, p) = −∞ as p ↑ ς, and thus (Dw)(y, p)−1 ↑ 0 as p ↑ ς.
(ii) If w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly, then (Dw)(y, p) = −∞ as
p ↑ ς. (iii) If w(y, ·) is twice continuously differentiable and limp↑ς(D
2w)(y, p)
exists, then it is “eventually concave” in the sense that there exists some
ǫ ∈ (0, ς) such that (D2w)(y, ·) < 0 on (ς − ǫ, ς). (iv) If w is twice continu-
ously differentiable and limp↑ς(D
2w)(y, p) exists, then lim supp↑ς ω(y, p) ≤ 0.
(v) If w is twice continuously differentiable and eventually decreases suffi-
ciently quickly, then lim infp↑ς ω(y, p) > −1.
Proof. (ii) is trivial. (i) and (iii) are both consequences of the following
technical result: If f : (0, 1) → (−∞, 0) is continuously differentiable,
limx↑1 f(x) = −∞, and limx↑1(Df)(x) exists, then limx↑1(Df)(x) = −∞.
For proof, note that the fundamental theorem of calculus requires that
lim
δ↓0
∫ 1−δ
x
(Df)(y)dy = −∞.
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If limx↑1(Df)(x) exists and were finite, then lim supx↑1(Df)(x) > −∞ and
this integral would be finite. Thus if limx↑1(Df)(x) exists then limx↑1(Df)(x) =
−∞. The assumption that the limit exists is required because (Df) could
be highly oscillatory (in a manner similar to sin(x−1)) and still generate
limx↑1 f(x) = −∞.
(iv): By (iii), (D2w)(y, p) is negative for all p sufficiently close to ς. Thus
ω(y, p) < 0 for all p sufficiently close to ς.
(v): Note that −ω(y, p) = D[(Dw)(y, p)−1]. The mean value theorem
then states that for all δ ∈ (0, ς), there exists some ǫ ∈ (0, δ] such that
1
(Dw)(y, ς − δ)
= −
(
1
(Dw)(y, ς)
−
1
(Dw)(y, ς − δ)
)
= −
(
−ω(y, ς−ǫ)δ
)
= ω(y, ς−ǫ)δ.
Because w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly, there exists γ > 0 and
α > 1 such that
ω(y, ς − ǫ)δ =
1
(Dw)(y, ς − δ)
≥ −
(
δ
α
)
.
Thus ω(y, ς − ǫ) ≥ −α−1 > −1, and thus lim infp↑ς ω(y, p) > −1. Note that
we have not assumed limp↑ς ω(y, p) exists in proving that lim infp↑ς ω(y, p) >
−1. 
6.2. A Variational Approach. The natural approach to characterizing
profit-maximizing prices when ς < ∞ would be to assume firms solve the
bound-constrained optimization problem
maximize πˆf (p) with respect to pf ∈ [0, ς]
Jf .
The KKT conditions are the Variational Inequality (VI)
(16) (∇f πˆf )(p)
⊤(pf − qf ) ≥ 0 for all qf ∈ [0, ς]
Jf
This approach is, unfortunately, not useful because of the following result:
Lemma 6.4. Suppose ϑ > −∞, costs satisfy Assumption 5.1, Assump-
tion 6.1 holds with ς < ∞, and w eventually decreases sufficiently quickly.
Then πˆf (p) can be continuously differentiably extended to [0,∞)
J , where
(Dkπˆf )(p) = 0 whenever pk ≥ ς, k ∈ Jf .
Proof. Suppose q ∈ (0, ς1). Then
(Dkπˆf )(q) = λk(q)

qk − ck(Pk(q))− ∑
j∈Jf
PLj (q)(qj − cj(Pj(q))) −
1
|(Dwk)(qk)|

 .
Each quantity can be extended, continuously, to [0, ς]J , and thus so can
(Dkπˆf ). Note in particular that the term in parentheses tends to
ς − ck(0)−
∑
j∈Jf ,pj<ς
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p)))
which is finite, and λk(p) ↑ 0 as pk ↑ ς. Thus (Dkπˆf )(p) = 0 when pk =
ς. 
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As a result, the standard VI (16) does not provide any information about
profit-optimal prices or equilibria that have some prices equal to ς. For an
extreme illustration of this fact, note that pf = ς1 (trivially) solves (16).
However, ς1 cannot possible be profit-maximizing, because πˆf (ς,1,p−f ) = 0
while πˆf (pf ,p−f ) > 0 for any pf satisfying cf (Pf (p)) < pf < ς1.
The ζ fixed-point form introduced above provides a convenient solution
to this problem.
Theorem 6.5. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumptions 5.1 and 6.1 hold, w eventu-
ally decreases sufficiently quickly and has sub-quadratic second derivatives.
For any p ∈ [0, ς]J , let J ◦f = {j ∈ Jf : pj < ς}, J
∗
f = {j ∈ Jf : pj = ς} and
if j ∈ J ∗f , define
ζj(p) = lim
pj↑ς
ζj(p) =
∑
j∈J ◦
f
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))).
(i) If pf ∈ [0, ς]
Jf locally maximizes πˆf (·,p−f ) then pj = cj(Pj(p))+ζj(p)
for all j ∈ J ◦f and ς − cj(0)− ζj(p) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ J
∗
f . (ii) If, in addition,
limp↑ς(D
2w)(y, ·) exists and (D2C)(y, P ) is finite as P ↓ 0 for all y ∈ Y,
then pj = cj(Pj(p)) + ζj(p) for all j ∈ J
◦
f and ς − cj(0) − ζj(p) ≤ 0 for all
j ∈ J ∗f is sufficient pf ∈ [0, ς]
Jf to maximize πˆf (·,p−f ).
Proof. Note that πˆf (·,p−f ) is continuously differentiable on (0,∞)
Jf , and
thus we can apply the vector mean value theorem to πˆf (·,p−f ) on (0, ς]
Jf .
We also note that there exist neighborhoods U∗f and U
◦
f , of p
∗
f and p
◦
f
respectively, and a map p◦f : (U
∗
f ∩ [0, ς]
J∗
f ) → U◦f such that (p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),q
∗
f ) ∈
U◦f × (U
∗
f ∩ [0, ς]
J∗
f ) and p◦f (q
∗
f ) is the unique solution to
(∇◦f πˆf )
(
q◦f ,q
∗
f ,p−f ) = 0
as a problem in q◦f only. This actually follows from the Implicit Function
Theorem, applied to the continuously differentiable extension of ϕ to all of
[0, ς]J given below in Lemma 6.7. Because of the sufficiency of stationarity,
when w has sub-quadratic second derivatives, p◦f (q
∗
f ) is, in fact, the unique
local maximizer of πˆf (·,q
∗
f ,p−f ) on U
◦
f . Thus
πˆf
(
q◦f ,q
∗
f ,p−f ) < πˆf
(
p◦f (q
∗
f ),q
∗
f ,p−f )
for all q∗f ∈ U
∗
f ∩ [0, ς]
J∗
f and q◦f ∈ U
◦
f . Furthermore, (D
∗
fp
◦
f )(q
∗
f ) → 0 as
q∗f ↑ ς1. For (D
∗
fp
◦
f )(q
∗
f ) solves
(D◦fϕ
◦
f )(q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f )(D
∗
fp
◦
f )(q
∗
f ) = (D
∗
fϕ
◦
f )(q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f )
while (D∗fϕ
◦
f )(p) = limq∗f↑ς1(D
∗
fϕ
◦
f )(q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f ) → 0, and (D
◦
fϕ
◦
f )(p)
is nonsingular.
(i): The necessity of ϕj(p) = pj − cj(Pj(p)) − ζj(p) = 0 for j ∈ J
◦
f is
obvious. Suppose then that there is some j ∈ J ∗f such that ς−cj(0)−ζj(p) >
0. We can choose the neighborhood U∗f above so that ϕj(qf ,p−f ) > 0 for
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all qf = (q
◦
f ,q
∗
f ) ∈ U
◦
f × (U
∗
f ∩ [0, ς]
J∗
f ). Letting q∗f = ς1 − (ς − qj)ej for
some qj < ς (that is, changing only the j
th products’ price), the vector mean
value theorem states that there exists some r∗f = ς1− (ς − τ)ej, τ ∈ (qj, ς),
such that
πˆf (p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),q
∗
f ,p−f ) = πˆf (p) + (Dj πˆf )(r
∗
f ,p
◦
f (r
∗
f ),p−f )(ς − qj) > πˆf (p).
Thus pf is not locally profit-maximizing for πˆf (·,p−f ). By contraposition,
(i) holds.
(ii): Define πˆ∗f (q
∗
f ) = πˆf (q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f ). Also let ∇
∗
f πˆf and ∇
◦
f πˆf de-
note the derivatives of firm f ’s profits with respect to the prices of products
in J ∗f and J
◦
f , respectively. Note that
(∇∗πˆ∗f )(q
∗
f ) = (∇
∗πˆf )(q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f ) + (D
∗
fp
◦
f )(q
∗
f )
⊤(∇◦πˆf )(q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f )
= (∇∗πˆf )(q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f )
because (∇◦πˆf )(q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f ) = 0, by definition. Let q
∗
f = ς1 − δ for
some δ ≥ 0, δ 6= 0. Then the vector mean value theorem states that there
exists r∗f = ς1− τδ, τ ∈ (0, 1), such that
πˆf (q
∗
f ,q
◦
f ,p−f ) ≤ πˆ
∗
f (q
∗
f ) = πˆ
∗
f (p
∗
f )−(∇
∗
f πˆ
∗
f )(r
∗
f )
⊤δ = πˆf (p)−(∇
∗
f πˆf )(r
∗
f ,p
◦
f (r
∗
f ),p−f )
⊤δ
Note also that
ϕ∗f (q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f ) = ϕ
∗
f (p)−
(
(D∗fϕ
∗
f )(p) + (D
◦
fϕ
∗
f )(p)(D
∗
fp
◦
f )(ς1)
)
δ +O(||δ||2)
= ϕ∗f (p)− (D
∗
fϕ
∗
f )(p)δ +O(||δ||
2)
= ϕ∗f (p)− (I −Ω
∗
f (ς1))δ +O(||δ||
2)
Because ϕ∗f (p) ≤ 0 and 1−ωj(ς) > 0 for all j ∈ J
∗
f , ϕ
∗
f (q
∗
f ,p
◦
f (q
∗
f ),p−f ) < 0
for all δ 6= 0 sufficiently small.
For such δ ≥ 0, δ 6= 0, also satisfying q∗f = ς1− δ ∈ U
∗
f ∩ [0, ς]
J∗
f ,
(∇∗f πˆf )(r
∗
f ,p
◦
f (r
∗
f ),p−f ) = Λ
∗
f (r
∗
f ,p
◦
f (r
∗
f ),p−f )ϕ
∗
f (r
∗
f ,p
◦
f (r
∗
f ),p−f ) ≥ 0
with at least one positive component. Thus (∇∗f πˆf )(r
∗
f ,p
◦
f (r
∗
f ),p−f )
⊤δ > 0,
and
πˆf (q
∗
f ,q
◦
f ,p−f ) ≤ πˆf (p)− (∇
∗
f πˆf )(r
∗
f ,p
◦
f (r
∗
f ),p−f )
⊤δ < πˆf (p).
p−f is thus a local maximizer of πˆf (·,p−f ). 
Corollary 6.6. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumption 5.1 holds with D2C finite
as P ↓ 0, and 6.1 holds with w that eventually decreases sufficiently quickly,
has sub-quadratic second derivatives, and limp↑ς(D
2w)(y, p) exists. (i) p−f
locally maximizes πˆf (·,p−f ), for any p−f ∈ [0, ς]
J−f , if, and only if, p−f
solves the VI
(17) ϕf (p)
⊤(pf − qf ) ≤ 0 for all qf ∈ [0, ς]
Jf .
(ii) p is a local equilibrium if, and only if, p solves the VI
(18) ϕ(p)⊤(p− q) ≤ 0 for all q ∈ [0, ς]J .
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Theorem 6.5 also suggests the following general demonstration that it is
possible for prices to be equal to ς in equilibrium if unit costs to be constant
and differ within firms. Let cj = ς−κ be constant unit costs for some κ > 0
and observe that ς − cj − πˆf (p) < 0 if, and only if, κ < πˆf (p). Because
πˆf (p) is independent of cj when pj = ς, κ can be made small enough so that
it is less than any lower bound on the optimal profits for firm f excluding
product j from their set of offerings. Setting cj = ς −κ with such a value of
κ then ensures that pj = ς is locally profit-optimal for the original problem
including product j.
6.3. Existence of Equilibrium. To prove the existence of equilibrium, it
remains to show that profit-maximizing prices are unique. While the mod-
ified VI (18) can be used to characterize profit-maximizing prices, smooth
nonlinear systems are often easier to analyze. Particularly, establishing the
uniqueness of profit-maximizing prices with (17) would traditionally require
strict monotonicity of ϕf [23], a property that may be difficult to verify.
These obstacles can be overcome by continuously extending the ζ map, and
thus ϕ, to all of [0,∞)J in such a way that solutions of the nonlinear system
with the extended ϕ are solutions to the VIs (17) and (18). This enables
an existence and uniqueness proofs using the same process applied above.
Another approach, enabled by the analysis below, is to apply a VI unique-
ness theorem due to Simsek et. al [47, Proposition 5.1] also based on the
Poincare-Hopf Theorem.
Lemma 6.7. Suppose ϑ > −∞, Assumption 5.1 holds with D2C finite as
P ↓ 0, and 6.1 holds with w that eventually decreases sufficiently quickly,
has sub-quadratic second derivatives, and limp↑ς(D
2w)(y, p) exists. Define
the map z : [0,∞)J → RJ componentwise by
zk(p) =


∑
j∈J ◦
f(j)
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) +
1
|(Dwj)(pj)|
if pk < ς
ωk(ς)(pk − ς) +
∑
j∈J ◦
f(k)
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) if pk ≥ ς
and the map Φ : [0,∞)J → RJ by Φ(p) = p− c(P(p)) − z(p).
(i) z (or Φ) is a continuously differentiable extension of ζ (or ϕ) from
[0, ς]J to [0,∞)J . (ii) For all j, Φj(p) < 0 when p ≥ c(P(p)) and pj =
cj(Pj(p)) and there exists p¯j such that Φj(p) > 0 for all pj > p¯j, regardless
of p−j . (iii) Φf (pf ,p−f ) = 0 if, and only if, proj[0,ς](pf ) solves the VI
(17), where “proj[0,ς]” denotes the projection onto [0, ς]
Jf . (iv) Φ(p) = 0
if, and only if, proj[0,ς](p) solves the VI (18), where “proj[0,ς]” denotes the
projection onto [0, ς]J .
Proof. (i): The claim concerning z and ζ follow by taking derivatives for
any prices in (0, ς)J and taking limits. Specifically, (Dlζk)(p) = ωk(pk)δk,l+
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(Dlπ¯f )(p). Now, (Dlπ¯f )(p) → 0 as pl ↑ ς, from which we can deduce the
following:
• (Dlζk)(p) = (Dlzk)(p) when k, l ∈ J
◦,
• (Dlζk)(p)→ ωk(ς)δk,l = (Dlzk)(p) as pk, pl ↑ ς,
• (Dlζk)(p)→ 0 = (Dlzk)(p) when pk < ς but pl ↑ ς, and
• (Dlζk)(p)→ (Dlπ¯f(k))(p) = (Dlzk)(p) when pk ↑ ς but pl < ς.
The claim concerning Φ and ϕ is an obvious consequence, noting that
Dl[ck(Pk(p))] ↓ 0 as pk or pl ↑ ς, and thus c(P(p)) is continuously differen-
tiable on [0,∞)J .
(ii): The first part of this claim follows from the corresponding result for
ϕj . To prove the second part, note that, by definition,
Φk(p) = (1− ωk(ς))(pk − ς) + ς − ck(0) −
∑
j∈J ◦
f(k)
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p)))
for all pj ≥ ς. Because
∑
j∈J ◦
f(k)
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) is bounded over
[0,∞)J and wk has finite sub-quadratic second derivatives, p¯k ≥ ς can be
chosen large enough so that Φk(p) > 0 for all pk ≥ p¯k, regardless of p−k.
(iii) and (iv): We prove (iv), the proof for (iii) being nearly identical. Let
Φ(p) = 0. Then ϕj(p) = 0 for all j ∈ J
◦ and
pk − ck(0)− ωk(ς)(pk − ς)−
∑
j∈J ◦
f(k)
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) = 0.
Therefore
ς − ck(0) −
∑
j∈J ◦
f(k)
PLj (p)(pj − cj(P
L
j (p))) = −(1− ωk)(pk − ς) ≤ 0.
This implies that p solves the VI (18). Conversely, suppose q ∈ [0, ς]J solves
the VI (18). Define pk = qk for all k ∈ J
◦ and pk = ς − ϕk(q)/(1 − ωk(ς))
for all k ∈ J ∗. Note that Φk(p) = ϕk(q) = 0, pk ≥ ς for all k ∈ J
∗ (because
ϕk(q) ≤ 0 for all such k), and, for all k ∈ J
∗,
Φk(p) = pk − ck(0)− ωk(ς)(pk − ς)−
∑
j∈J ◦
f(k)
PLj (q)(pj − cj(P
L
j (q)))
= (1− ωk(ς))(pk − ς) + ϕk(q) = 0.
Thus q = proj[0,ς](p) and Φ(p) = 0. 
The obvious corollary is as follows:
Corollary 6.8. Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 6.7, and let p ∈ [0,∞)J .
(i) proj[0,ς](pf ) locally maximizes πˆf (·,p−f ) if, and only if, Φf (p) = 0. (ii)
proj[0,ς](p) is a local equilibrium if, and only if, Φ(p) = 0.
An adaptation of the techniques in Sections 4 and 5 again establishes the
uniqueness of profit-maximizing prices.
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Lemma 6.9. Assume the hypotheses of Lemma 6.7. For any p−f , the
nonlinear system Φf (pf ,p−f ) = 0 has a unique solution pf ∈ [0,∞)
Jf
satisfying cj(Pj(p)) < pj for all j ∈ Jf with pj < ς for at least one j ∈ Jf .
Proof. For any p−f , Φf (·,p−f ) has a zero in the interior of {pf : pf ≥
cf (Pf (p))}; the proof is exactly analogous to the proof of existence in the
case ς =∞: We first show that the homotopy ρf between [0,∞)
Jf and {pf :
pf ≥ cf (Pf (p))} still exists. The inverse map pf 7→ ǫf = pf − cf (Pf (p))
is again well-defined and continuous, trivially. ρf (ǫf ) is ostensibly defined
by pf = cf (P
L
f (p)) + ǫf . For ǫk = ς − ck(0) + δ, δ ≥ 0, ρk(ǫ) = ς + δ solves
this fixed-point equation regardless of ǫj , j 6= k:
pk = ς + δ = ck(0) + (ς − ck(0) + δ) = ck(Pk(p)) + ǫk
Note that (Dǫkρk)(ǫf ) = δk,l for ǫk > ς.
Supposing pf < ς1,
Df
[
cf (P
L
f (p))+ǫf
]
= (D2Cf )(P
L
f (p))Λf (p)−(D
2Cf )(P
L
f (p))P
L
f (p)λf (p)
⊤.
As pk ↑ ς, the k
th row and kth column of this matrix vanish because
limP↓0(D
2Cj)(P ) < ∞. In particular, the proof that the spectrum of the
fixed-point map does not contain 1 given before holds on [0,∞)Jf . Con-
structing an upper bound on the magnitude of the fixed point for any ǫ
then proves the fixed point is unique, again by Kellogg’s uniqueness theo-
rem.
The vanishing of the derivatives also proves that (Dlρk)(ǫf ) → δk,l as
either pk or pl ↑ ς, k, l ∈ Jf , and thus ρf is continuously differentiable on
[0,∞)Jf . ρf must then be continuous on [0,∞)
Jf .
As before, consider the vector field Ψf = Φf ◦ ρf : [0,∞)
Jf → RJf . This
vector field points outward on the boundary of [0, p¯f ], where the existence
of p¯f was established in Lemma 6.7. By the Poincare-Hopf Theorem, Ψf
has a zero ǫf ∈ (0, p¯f ), which is uniquely related to a zero pf = ρf (ǫf )
satisfying cj(Pj(p)) < pj for all j ∈ Jf . Note that this zero cannot have
pj ≥ ς for all j ∈ Jf : For if that were true, then
ς ≤
(
1
1− ωj(ς)
)
cj(0)−
(
ωj(ς)
1− ωj(ς)
)
ς = −
(
1
1− ωj(ς)
)
(ς−cj(0))+ ς < ς.
By contradiction, there must exist some j ∈ Jf such that pj < ς.
Uniqueness of profit-maximizing prices follows from a very similar ap-
proach to that used previously. Here we show that any zero of Φf has index
one, and the rest of the proof proceeds exactly the same way. Note that
• (DlΦk)(p) = (Dlϕk)(p) when k, l ∈ J
◦
f ,
• (DlΦk)(p) = (1− ωk(ς))δk,l when k, l ∈ J
∗
f
• (DlΦk)(p) = 0 when k ∈ J
◦
f but l ∈ J
∗
f
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These relations imply that there exists a symmetric permutation Tf to make
(DfΦf )(p) block-triangular:
(DfΦf )(p) = Tf
[
(D◦fϕ
◦
f )(p) 0
A I−Ω∗f (ς)
]
Tf
where A is some matrix. Thus
det(DfΦf )(p) = (detTf )
2 det
(
(D◦fϕ
◦
f )(p)
)
det
(
I−Ω∗f (ς)
)
and, because 1− ωk(ς) > 0,
sign det(DfΦf )(p) = sign det
(
(D◦fϕ
◦
f )(p)
)
.
But ϕ◦f is identical to the ϕf map if we exclude the products J
∗
f from Jf ,
and p◦f are profit-maximizing prices strictly in the interior of [0, ς]
J◦
f where
J◦f = |J
◦
f |. Then
(−1)J
◦
f = sign det(D◦f πˆ
◦
f )(p) = sign detΛ
◦
f (p)sign det
(
(D◦fϕ
◦
f )(p)
)
= (−1)J
◦
f sign det
(
(D◦fϕ
◦
f )(p)
)
implies
sign det(DfΦf )(p) = sign det
(
(D◦fϕ
◦
f )(p)
)
= 1.

This result can also be proved using the uniqueness theorem for VI’s given
by Simsek et. al [47, Proposition 5.1].
7. Properties of Equilibrium Prices
This section establishes properties that the finite prices and markups of
any equilibrium must satisfy based on properties of ζ. The most general re-
sult is Corollary 7.1, which states that the difference between profit optimal
markups for two products offered by the same firm with prices less than ς
depends only on the prices and characteristics of those two products when
unit costs are constant. This property is very similar to the embodiment of
the “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives” (IIA) property in Logit mod-
els: the ratio of choice probabilities depends only on the characteristics and
prices of those two products [50]. In Corollaries 7.5 through 7.8 this result
is applied to concave-in-price utility functions under hypotheses on the unit
cost and value functions to illuminate some counterintuitive properties of
equilibrium prices under Logit. This is the only section of the article that
focuses somewhat on concave-in-price utility functions.
7.1. Properties of Profit-Optimal Prices. For this subsection, we focus
on a single firm f ∈ N(F ) and derive our results as properties of locally
profit-optimal prices. Naturally, these properties will be manifest in locally
equilibrium prices as well. This section is also the only portion of this article
in which we focus heavily on concave in price utilities, which will satisfy our
existence conditions.
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The basic observation is as follows.
Corollary 7.1. Suppose Assumptions 5.1 and 6.1 hold. Let pf be profit
maximizing. For any j, k ∈ J ◦f ,
(19)
(
pj−cj(Pj(p))
)
−
(
pk−ck(Pk(p))
)
= −
(
1
(Dwj)(pj)
−
1
(Dwk)(pk)
)
.
That is, the difference between profit optimal markups for any two prod-
ucts offered by a single firm depends only on the corresponding utility deriva-
tives. If unit costs are constant, this implies that the difference between
profit optimal markups for any two products offered by a single firm de-
pends only on the characteristics and prices of those products.
Proof. Eqn. (19) follows immediately from the fixed-point equation pj =
cj(Pj(p)) + π¯f (p) + |(Dwj)(pj)|
−1 for all j ∈ J ◦f . 
One application is motivated by the frequent application of constant co-
efficient linear in price utility functions.
Corollary 7.2. Suppose Assumption 5.1 holds. If w(y, p) ≡ −αp for some
α > 0, pj − cj(Pj(p)) = pk − ck(Pk(p)) for all j, k ∈ Jf when pf is profit-
maximizing.
In other words, profit-optimal markups are constant regardless of product
costs or the value of product characteristics. Constant intra-firm markups
have appeared as an assumption [44, 16], but not often proven to be an
equilibrium outcome.
The following example motivates the more general propositions on profit-
optimal markups given below. Consider the quadratic in price utility w(y, p) ≡
w(p) = −αp2 and constant unit costs. Then
(pj − cj)− (pk − ck) =
(
1
2α
)(
1
pj
−
1
pk
)
,
demonstrating that locally profit optimal markups decrease with the corre-
sponding prices (i.e., pj − cj > pk − ck if and only if pj < pk). Rearranging
and setting λ = 1/(2α), we obtain(
pj −
λ
pj
)
−
(
pk −
λ
pk
)
= cj − ck.
The function ηλ(p) = p − λ/p is strictly increasing in p for non-negative λ,
and thus cj > ck implies pj > pk. Thus, locally profit optimal prices increase
with costs while the corresponding markups decrease with costs. Additionally,
we note that if cj = ck then pj = pk, even if yj 6= yk; that is, profit-optimal
prices reflect only product costs, not value.
We first generalize the counterintuitive property that differences in char-
acteristics that do not impact costs or (local) willingness to pay do not
impact prices, even if they impact product value.
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Corollary 7.3. Suppose unit costs are constant, 6.1 holds and w has sub-
quadratic second derivatives. Let pf be profit-maximizing, and suppose that
cj = ck and (Dwj)(p) = (Dwk)(p) for all p ∈ (0, ς) for some j, k ∈ J
◦
f , even
if yj 6= yk. Then pj = pk.
In other words, for any separable utility with sub-quadratic second deriva-
tives, profit-optimal prices are determined by costs, not value. One would
expect that real firms would not follow this rule, charging higher markups
for the more valued product.
Proof. Corollary 7.1 implies
pj −
1
|(Dwj)(pj)|
= θ(pj) = θ(pk) = pk −
1
|(Dwk)(pj)|
.
Because the map θ(p) = p − 1/ |(Dwj)(p)| = p − 1/ |(Dwk)(p)| is strictly
increasing when w has sub-quadratic second derivatives, pj = pk. 
This proposition, as stated, must be restricted to constant unit costs. A
weaker result applies for non-constant unit costs:
Corollary 7.4. Assume Assumption 5.1 holds, unit costs are strictly con-
vex, 6.1 holds, w has sub-quadratic second derivatives. Let pf be profit-
optimal, and suppose that cj(P ) = ck(P ) = c(P ) for all P ∈ [0, 1] and
(Dwj)(p) = (Dwk)(p) for all p ∈ [0, ς) for some j, k ∈ J
◦
f , even if yj 6= yk.
Then pj > pk if, and only if, Pj(p) > Pk(p), pj = pk if, and only if,
Pj(p) = Pk(p), and pj < pk if, and only if, Pj(p) < Pk(p).
This result may also be seen as slightly counterintuitive, as higher-priced
products are intuitively associated with lower choice probabilities.
Proof. Corollary 7.1 implies
θ(pj)− θ(pk) = c(Pj(p))− c(Pk(p))
Because total costs are strictly convex, unit costs are strictly increasing in
P . Thus,
pj > pk ⇐⇒ θ(pj) > θ(pk) ⇐⇒ c(Pj(p)) > c(Pk(p)) ⇐⇒ Pj(p) > Pk(p)
pj = pk ⇐⇒ θ(pj) = θ(pk) ⇐⇒ c(Pj(p)) = c(Pk(p)) ⇐⇒ Pj(p) = Pk(p)
pj < pk ⇐⇒ θ(pj) < θ(pk) ⇐⇒ c(Pj(p)) < c(Pk(p)) ⇐⇒ Pj(p) < Pk(p)
.

Corollary 7.1 also implies the second counterintuitive property of locally
profit optimal markups − that they decrease with costs − under Logit with
any utility function that is both strictly concave in price and separable in
price and characteristics.
Corollary 7.5. Suppose that w is separable in price and characteristics
and strictly concave in price. Then firm f ’s higher unit cost products (at
optimality) have lower locally profit optimal markups. That is, if j, k ∈ J ◦f
and cj(Pj(p)) > ck(Pk(p)), then pj − cj(Pj(p)) < pk − ck(Pk(p)).
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Proof. We prove that pj − cj(Pj(p)) ≥ pk − ck(Pk(p)) implies cj(Pj(p)) ≤
ck(Pk(p)). By Corollary 7.1, pj − cj(Pk(p)) ≥ pk − ck(Pk(p)) implies
(Dw)(pj)
−1 ≤ (Dw)(pk)
−1 or, equivalently, (Dw)(pj) ≥ (Dw)(pk). By strict
concavity, this implies that pj ≤ pk. But then pj−cj(Pj(p)) ≥ pk−ck(Pk(p))
implies that
cj(Pj(p)) − ck(Pk(p)) ≤ pj − pk ≤ 0

When unit costs are constant, these propositions can be easily connected
to value. Intuition holds that both locally profit optimal markups and costs
should increase with value, if not costs. The following assumption makes
this connection explicit.
Assumption 7.1 (Value Costs Hypothesis). More valued products cost
more per unit to offer; that is, v(y) > v(y′) implies that c(y) > c(y′) for all
y,y′ ∈ Y.
Mussa & Rosen [35] include this as a basic feature of cost functions.
Bresnahan [14] has also remarked that this is a natural condition. When
considering equilibrium prices, this assumption need only be applied within
firms. That is, there may be firm-specific cost functions each independently
satisfying the value costs hypothesis, while the value costs hypothesis is
violated across firms. This states that two distinct firms can produce a
value-equivalent product at distinct unit costs without violating the results
that apply this hypothesis. With this definition, we provide the following
restatement of Corollary 7.5.
Corollary 7.6. Suppose unit costs are constant, Assumption 6.1 holds, w
is separable in price and characteristics, strictly concave in price, and that
the value costs hypothesis holds. Then firm f ’s higher value products have
lower locally profit optimal markups. That is, if j, k ∈ Jf and vj > vk, then
pj − cj < pk − ck.
Proof. vj > vk implies cj > ck, and the result follows from Corollary 7.5. 
Markups can increase with value when w is convex in price. Consider
w(y, p) ≡ w(p) = −α log p and constant unit costs, for which
(pj − cj)− (pk − ck) =
(
1
α
)
(pj − pk) .
Thus, locally profit optimal markups increase with the corresponding prices.
This implies
pj − pk =
(
1
α− 1
)
(cj − ck).
Hence if α > 1, locally profit optimal prices increase with costs, and locally
profit optimal markups increase with costs. While this is a more intuitive
outcome, it comes from a less intuitive utility specification.
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Another assumption, the “unique value hypothesis,” further connects
value with profit-optimal prices. As defined by Nagle [36], the unique value
hypothesis postulates that as a product’s combination of characteristics be-
comes more valued, individuals are less sensitive to price changes. This is
transcribed to our framework as follows.
Assumption 7.2 (Unique Value Hypothesis). For any y,y′ ∈ Y, v(y) >
v(y′) implies
|(Dw)(y, p)| ≤
∣∣(Dw)(y′, p)∣∣ for all p ∈ (0, ς).
This definition suggests an example of a non-separable but convex in price
utility for which markups increase with value. Consider w(y, p) = −α(y)p,
where α : Y → (0,∞), and assume unit costs are constant. Then
(pj − c(yj))− (pk − c(yk)) =
(
1
α(yj)
−
1
α(yk)
)
,
and (pj − c(yj)) ≥ (pk − c(yk)) if and only if α(yj) ≤ α(yk). The unique
value hypothesis mandates that v(yj) > v(yk) implies α(yj) ≤ α(yk), and
hence markups do not decrease with value if this hypothesis holds. Note
that this is consistent with our previous result for constant coefficient linear
in price utility where α(y) ≡ α ∈ (0,∞). Whenever α(yj) < α(yk), that is
whenever the unique value hypothesis holds in a non-trivial way, markups
can strictly increase with value.
A related and important question is whether higher value products have
higher locally profit optimal prices. By Corollary 7.4, this cannot hold
without an additional hypothesis.
Corollary 7.7. Suppose unit costs are constant, Assumption 6.1 holds, w
has sub-quadratic second derivatives, satisfies the unique value hypothesis,
and the value costs hypothesis holds. Then firm f ’s higher value products
have higher locally profit optimal prices. That is, for any j, k ∈ J ◦f , vj > vk
implies that pj > pk when pf are profit-maximizing.
Proof. The unique value hypothesis implies that when v(y) > v(y′), θ(y, p) ≤
θ(y′, p) for all p ∈ (0, ς), where θ(y, p) = p − |(Dw)(y, p)|−1. Specifically,
if v(yj) > v(yk) then θj(pk) ≤ θk(pk). Suppose that v(yj) > v(yk) while
pj ≤ pk. Because θj(p) is a strictly increasing function of p, we have
θj(pj) ≤ θj(pk) ≤ θk(pk).
Thus Eqn. (19) implies that cj − ck = θj(pj)− θk(pk) ≤ 0, in contradiction
to the value costs hypothesis. 
Because any separable utility trivially satisfies the unique value hypothe-
ses, the following is a direct consequence of Corollary 7.7.
Corollary 7.8. Suppose unit costs are constant, Assumption 6.1 holds, w is
separable in price and characteristics, has sub-quadratic second derivatives,
and that the value costs hypothesis holds. Then firm f ’s higher value products
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have higher locally profit optimal prices. That is, vj > vk implies that pj >
pk for any j, k ∈ J
◦
f .
7.2. An Inter-Firm Property of Equilibrium Prices. Eqn. (19) is a
special case of the following:
Corollary 7.9. Suppose Assumptions 5.1 and 6.1 hold, and let p ∈ (0,∞)J
be equilibrium prices. For any f, g ∈ N(F ), j ∈ J ◦f , and k ∈ J
◦
g ,
(20)
(pj−cj(Pj(p)))−(pk−ck(Pk(p))) =
(
π¯f (p)−
1
(Dwj)(pj)
)
−
(
π¯g(p)−
1
(Dwk)(pk)
)
.
This equation expresses the existence of a portfolio effect present in equi-
librium pricing with multi-product firms, constant unit costs, and even the
simplest Logit model.
Corollary 7.10. Assume unit costs are constant, Assumption 6.1 holds,
w have sub-quadratic second derivatives, and p ∈ (0,∞)J are equilibrium
prices. Suppose that yj = yk and cf (yj) = cg(yk) for some j ∈ J
◦
f and
k ∈ J ◦g . Then pj > pk if, and only if, πˆf (p) > πˆg(p), pj < pk if, and only
if, πˆf (p) < πˆg(p), and pj = pk if, and only if, πˆf (p) = πˆg(p).
That is, equilibrium prices for the same product offered at the same cost
but by different firms are influenced by the profitability of other products
in these firms’ portfolios. Stated another way, if the other products offered
by a particular firm did not matter in determining equilibrium prices, then
we would expect yj = yk and cf (yj) = cg(yk) for some j ∈ Jf and k ∈ Jg
to imply that pj = pk.
Proof. The proof follows by observing that Eqn. (20) can be written θj(pj)−
θk(pk) = πˆf (p)− πˆg(p), and θj = θk. The result follows. 
8. Conclusions
This article has proved the existence of equilibrium prices for Bertrand
competition with multi-product firms under the Logit model without restric-
tive assumptions on the firms or their products. Instead of studying a partic-
ular utility function, general conditions on the utility function are identified
under which existence holds. The proofs circumvents fundamental obsta-
cles to the extension of existing equilibrium proofs for single-product firms
by applying the Poincare-Hopf theorem. One of the fixed-point equations
explicitly demonstrates that Logit price equilibrium problems are “single-
parameter problems” when unit costs are constant, even when firms offer
many products. By invoking the conventional assumption that utility is
concave in price and separable in price and characteristics along with the
reasonable assumption that more valued products always cost more to make
per unit, a counterintuitive result is obtained: the more the population val-
ues a product’s characteristics, the lower its profit-optimal markup.
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There are at least two important areas for future research. One is estab-
lishing the uniqueness of equilibrium prices. Kellogg’s uniqueness condition
for Brouwer-Schauder fixed-point theorem [26], used in Section 5, can be
applied to show that equilibrium prices under linear-in-price utility Logit
models are unique, a result already known for both single-product [28, 15]
and multi-product [45, 27] firms. Generalizing this analysis to nonlinear
utility functions and non-constant costs may be a promising direction. As
suggested in the introduction, another important area is the extension of this
analysis to non-Logit RUMs, especially those with heterogeneity. Formally
the η and ζ characterizations presented in this article extend to both any
GEV and Mixed Logit models; see [31, 33, 32] for the extension to Mixed-
Logit models, subsequent analysis, and application in large-scale compu-
tations of equilibrium prices. Establishing the existence of simultaneously
stationary prices using these characterizations is straightforward, but not
enough to ensure the existence of equilibrium [32].
Appendix A. Mathematical Notation
Sets. N denotes the natural numbers {1, 2, . . . }, and N(N) denotes the
natural numbers up to N , that is, N(N) = {1, . . . , N}. R denotes the set of
real numbers (−∞,∞), [0,∞) denotes the non-negative real numbers, and
[0,∞] denotes the extended non-negative half-line. We denote the (J − 1)-
dimensional simplex {(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ [0, 1]
N :
∑N
n=1 xn = 1} by S(N), and
the J-dimensional “pyramid” {(x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ [0, 1]
N :
∑N
n=1 xn ≤ 1} by
△(J). Hyper-rectangles in RN , i.e. sets of the form [a1, b1]× · · · × [aN , bN ]
for some an, bn ∈ R with an < bn for all n ∈ N(N), are denoted by [a,b]
where a = (a1, . . . , aN ) and b = (b1, . . . , bN ). For other sets, we typically
use calligraphic upper case letters such as “A”. For any set A, |A| denotes
its cardinality. For any B ⊂ A, A \ B denotes the set {b ∈ A : b /∈ B}. For
any set A, F(A) denotes the collection of finite subsets of A.
Symbols. Bold, un-italicized symbols (e.g., “x”) denote vectors and ma-
trices; typically we reserve lower case letters to refer to vectors and use
upper case letters to refer to matrices; the vector of choice probabilities “P”
is an exception made to conform with existing notation of these quantities.
Throughout we use 1 to denote a vector of ones of the appropriate size for
the context in which it appears. I always denotes the identity matrix of a
size appropriate for the context. For any x ∈ RN , diag(x) denotes the N×N
diagonal matrix whose diagonal is x. Any vector inequalities between vec-
tors are to be taken componentwise: for example, x < y means xn < yn for
all n. Random variables are denoted with capital letters “X”, with random
vectors being denoted with bold capital letters (e.g., “Q”). While this over-
laps with our notation for matrices, it should not cause any confusion. P
denotes a probability and E denotes an expectation. “log” always denotes
the natural (base e) logarithm. “ess sup” denotes the essential supremum
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of a measurable function, where the measure on measurable subsets of the
domain should always be clear.
Differentiation. Our conventions for denoting differentiation follow [34].
We use the symbol “D” to denote differentiation using subscripts to in-
voke additional specificity. Letting f : RM → RN , (Dmfn)(x) denotes the
derivative of the nth component function with respect to the mth variable
and (Df)(x) is the N ×M derivative matrix of f at x with components
((Df)(x))n,m = (Dmfn)(x). Thus for f : R
M → R, (Df)(x) is a row vector.
If f : RM → R, we define the gradient (∇f)(x) ∈ RM as the transposed
derivative: (∇f)(x) = (Df)(x)⊤.
Other Definitions. Let X be any topological space and let f : X → R. We
say x∗ ∈ X is a local maximizer (over X ) of f if there exists a neighborhood
of x∗, say U , such that f(x∗) ≥ f(x) for all x ∈ U . We say x∗ ∈ X is a
maximizer (over X ) of f if f(x∗) ≥ f(x) for all x ∈ X .
Appendix B. Examples for the Logit Model
We first provide some examples of indirect utilities to illustrate properties
(a-c). A linear in price utility, given by w(y, p) = −α(y)p for some α :
Y → (0,∞), satisfies (a-c). More generally, any “Cobb-Douglas” in price
utility, given by w(y, p) = −α(y)pβ(y) with α, β : Y → (0,∞), satisfies
(a-c). A “Cobb-Douglas” specification for “remaining income,” w(y, p) =
α(y)(ς−p)β(y) is a bit more complicated, being a function finite for all finite
prices and satisfying (a-c) only for β : Y → (2N+1), where 2N+1 denotes the
set of odd positive integers: if β(y) : Y → (−∞, 0) then w is not finite for all
finite p; clearly w violates (a) if β(y) = 0; if β(y) > 0 is not an integer, then
w is complex for p > ς; finally, if β(y) ∈ N is not an odd positive integer then
w violates (a). The common “log-transformed” Cobb-Douglas in “remaining
income” utility w(y, p) = α(y) log(ς − p) for p < ς <∞, α : Y → (0,∞),9 is
not finite for all finite prices. Allenby & Rossi’s negative log of price utility,
given by w(y, p) = −α(y) log p for α : Y → (0,∞) satisfies (a-c) [2]. Finally,
the utility w(p) = −α(log p−ε sin log p), where α > 1 and ε ∈ (0, 1), satisfies
(a-c).
We now demonstrate which of these utility functions is eventually log
bounded and/or eventually decreases sufficiently quickly. Any linear in
price or Cobb-Douglas in price utility is both eventually log bounded and
eventually decreases sufficiently quickly. For if β(y) ≥ 1, (Dw)(y, p) =
−α(y)β(y)pβ(y)−1 ↓ −∞ as p→∞. If β(y) < 1, then although (Dw)(y, p) =
9This log transformation usually occurs (see [10], [44]) based on the observation that
choices are invariant over increasing utility transformations, so that u′(y, p) = ew(y,p)ev(y)
yields the same random choices as the specification introduced in the text, with the caveat
that the additive errors introduced in the text are taken as multiplicative errors (with a
related distribution) in the former specification. In a Cobb-Douglas specification for the
former, u′(y, p) ∝ (ς − p)α(y) = eα(y) log(ς−p), illustrating that the logarithm of this utility
has the log-transformed specification for the price component.
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−α(y)β(y)p−(1−β(y)) ↑ 0 as p→∞,
(Dw)(y, p) −
r
p
= −α(y)β(y)
1
p1−β(y)
+
r
p
=
(
1
p
)[
r − α(y)β(y)pβ(y)
]
≤ 0
if p ≥ β(y)
√
α(y)β(y)/r and hence w(y, p) eventually decreases sufficiently
quickly for any r. The class of negative log of price utility functions con-
tain the most obvious examples of utilities that are neither eventually log
bounded nor eventually decrease sufficiently quickly; particularly w(y, p) ≤
−α(y) log p with α(y) ≤ 1. If α(y) < 1 there are no finite profit maximizing
prices under this utility.
In the text we defined utilities with sub-quadratic second derivatives. Any
linear in price utility has sub-quadratic second derivatives, since (D2w)(y, p) ≡
0. More generally, under any Cobb-Douglas in price utility
(D2w)(y, p)
(Dw)(y, p)2
= −
(
1
α(y)
)(
β(y) − 1
β(y)
)(
1
pβ(y)
)
=
(
β(y) − 1
β(y)
)(
1
w(y, p)
)
,
and hence w has sub-quadratic second derivatives if β(y) ≥ 1. If β(y) <
1, then w has sub-quadratic second derivatives only at (y, p) such that
|w(y, p)| > (1 − β(y))/β(y), i.e. p > β(y)
√
(1− β(y))/(α(y)β(y)). Finally,
if w(y, p) = −α(y) log p then (D2w)(y, p)/(Dw)(y, p)2 ≡ 1/α(y) and hence
w has sub-quadratic second derivatives if α(y) > 1. Hence far from re-
quiring concavity, some convex utility functions have sub-quadratic second
derivatives.
Let α(y) ≡ α > 0. For the linear-in-price utility, ζj(p) = πˆf (p)+1/α with
the fixed-point equation being pj = cj+ πˆf (p)+1/α. For any Cobb-Douglas
in price utility, ζj(p) = πˆf (p) + (1/(αβ))p
1−β
j with the fixed-point equation
being pj = cj + πˆf (p) + (1/(αβ))p
1−β
j . For negative log of price, ζj(p) =
πˆf (p)+(1/α)pj with the fixed-point equation being pj = cj+πˆf (p)+(1/α)pj .
Our proof that the negative log of price utility has no finite profit maxi-
mizing prices can be strengthened using the relationship between ζ and the
profit gradients. We already know that w(y, p)/1 = −(α(y)/1) log p does
not eventually decrease sufficiently quickly when α(y) ≤ 1. We have also
observed that ζj(p) = πˆf (p) + (1/αj)pj , which implies that
ζj(p)−(pj−cj) = (πˆf (p)+cj)+
(
1
αj
− 1
)
pj = (πˆf (p)+cj)+
(
1− αj
αj
)
pj.
Thus, if αj = α(yj) ≤ 1, the j
th price derivative of profit is always positive.
While we have already shown that only infinite prices maximize profits under
this utility when αj < 1, this shows the same holds for αj = 1 as well even
though the corresponding maximal profits are finite.
We now present an example of a utility function for which has finite
profit-maximizing prices but for which a “local” criterion restricting profit
maximization at infinity fails. This local criterion is simply that profits
decrease for all sufficiently large prices. Let w(p) = −α(log p − ε sin log p)
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with α > 1 and ε ∈ [1− α−1, 1). Then pj − cj − ζj(p) ≥ 0 if and only if
(21) pj
(
1−
1
α(1− ε cos log pj)
)
≥ cj + πˆf (p).
But based on our choice of ε, there exist arbitrarily large pj such that the
left hand side above is non-positive: For all p¯ there exists some pj > p¯
such that α(1 − ε cos log pj) = α(1 − ε) ≤ 1, which implies the claim. Since
cj + πˆf (p) is positive (or rather is for all p that matter), the inequality (21)
is violated and there exist arbitrarily large pj such that profits increase,
locally, with pj, despite the fact that profits must vanish as pf → ∞ since
this utility is eventually log bounded. That is, the local criterion for finite
profit maximizing prices is violated.
Appendix C. Inapplicability of Supermodularity
This appendix states a generalization of Sandor’s [45] result that profits
are neither supermodular nor log-supermodular arbitrarily close to equilib-
rium prices under Logit with linear in price utility [45, Chapter 4]. Such a
result rules out the applicability of the approach developed by Milgrom &
Roberts [28] to proving existence of equilibrium prices in the multi-product
firm setting by implying that there cannot exist a compact set with non-
empty interior containing any equilibrium on which Logit profits are super-
modular or log-supermodular.
Lemma C.1. Let ϑ > −∞, unit costs be constant, and Assumption 3.1
hold with a w with sub-quadratic second derivatives. Suppose p∗f ∈ (0,∞)
Jf
maximizes πˆf (·,p−f ). Then for any ε > 0, there exists a pf such that
||pf − p
∗
f || < ε, and (DlDkπˆf )(p) < 0, and (DlDk log πˆf )(p) < 0 for all
k, l ∈ Jf , k 6= l, where p = (pf ,p−f ).
Naturally, because supermodularity has been used to prove the existence
of equilibrium prices under Logit for single-product firms, the proof relies
on the fact that firms produce more than one product.
Proof. It can be shown that when k, l ∈ Jf and k 6= l, the second derivatives
of profits are given by
(DlDkπˆf )(q)
= |(Dwk)(qk)|P
L
k (q)
(
πˆf (q)− (qk − ck)− (Dwk)(qk)
−1
)
PLl (q) |(Dwl)(ql)|
+ |(Dwk)(qk)|P
L
k (q)
(
πˆf (q)− (ql − cl)− (Dwl)(ql)
−1
)
PLl (q) |(Dwl)(ql)|
for any q. The goal is to choose q, ||q−p|| < ε, so that πˆf (q)− (qk − ck)−
(Dwk)(qk)
−1 < 0 and πˆf (q)− (ql − cl)− (Dwl)(ql)
−1 < 0 for any k, l ∈ Jf ,
k 6= l.
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By the ζ fixed-point characterization,
πˆf (pf ,p−f )− (pk − ck)− (Dwk)(pk)
−1
< πˆf (p
∗
f ,p−f )− (pk − ck)− (Dwk)(pk)
−1
= πˆf (p
∗
f ,p−f )− (p
∗
k − ck)− (pk − p
∗
k)− (Dwk)(pk)
−1
= (Dwk)(p
∗
k)
−1 − (Dwk)(pk)
−1 − (pk − p
∗
k).
Thus, πˆf (pf ,p−f )−(pk−ck)−(Dwk)(pk)
−1 < 0 if θk(pk) ≤ θk(p
∗
k). Because
w has sub-quadratic second derivatives, θk is strictly increasing and any
pk < p
∗
k − ε will do. The same logic goes for l ∈ Jf , and the claim follows.
For the second claim, note that
(DlDk log πˆf )(p) =
(DlDkπˆf )(p)πˆf (p)− (Dkπˆf )(p)(Dlπˆf )(p)
πˆf (p)2
.
We have already established that the first term in the numerator is negative
at p as defined above. Furthermore,
(Dkπˆf )(p) = |(Dwk)(pk)|P
L
k (p)(πˆf (p)− (pk − ck)− (Dwk)(pk)
−1) < 0
by the same argument and hence (Dkπˆf )(p)(Dlπˆf )(p) > 0, making the
second term in the numerator also negative. This completes the proof. 
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